A Place in the Orient
Put in simple terms, in his recently published German-language book "Der Traum vom deutschen Orient. Zwei deutsche Kolonien im Osmanischen Reich 1851-1918" (A place in the Orient: Two German Colonies in the Ottoman Empire 1851 - 1918), Malte Fuhrmann propounds the theory that one can learn as much about Germany's colonial policy in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean from reading Karl May's popular novels as from a close study of trade statistics.
The history of German imperialism has been the subject of growing interest over the past few years – and rightly so. In view of the fact that the main focus of this interest has been on German imperialist endeavours in Africa, Fuhrmann's book fills in some major gaps.
"Moral conquests"
German ambitions have always played a subordinate role in history books about the Mediterranean. It is a commonly held view that Germany is highly respected in the countries of the Southern Mediterranean because unlike the United Kingdom, France, or Italy, Germany never pursued colonial projects in this part of the world.
Fuhrmann uses the examples of the West Anatolian city of Smyrna (Izmir) and the Greek Macedonian city of Saloniki (Thessaloniki) on the western shore of the Aegean Sea to illustrate that this interpretation falls short of the truth.
The history of colonialism comprises more than just military operations and economic undertakings; it also includes moral conquests that were used in an attempt to increase the influence of European states through culture.
Colonialism is not only a forcible extension of a country's domain, but also the non-military penetration of a foreign region.
The Greek War of Independence fired the imagination of many people in the German Confederation in the first half of the 19th Century. South-Eastern Europe suddenly appeared to be a viable alternative to emigration to America.
It was felt that targeted German settlements and the development of plantations in the region would create an important bulwark against the Ottoman Empire.
While such considerations were initially bolstered by the foundation of the German Empire in 1871, Chancellor Bismarck's lack of interest curbed the "drive to the South-East". The increasing lack of manpower in the German Empire, which eventually reversed the tide of emigration, was the final nail in the coffin of interest in settlement projects abroad and in the Mediterranean.
The "heirs of Hellenic culture"
Nevertheless, this interest was not without its consequences. Fuhrmann uses the example of excavations in the Aegean to illustrate the significance of the region for debates on identity back home in Germany. The ancient artefacts dug up during these excavations offered the Empire not only the chance to build up archaeological collections that enhanced its glory, but also the opportunity to style itself as the "heir of Hellenic culture".
While archaeological expeditions and the enthusiasm for antiquity helped shape a German identity, the religious and secular missionary projects undertaken in Greece and Asia Minor sought to bring about a radical cultural transformation of the region. The building of schools and hospitals was an important way of binding people to Germany.
The content of such missions was not without controversy; in many ways, it reflected the ideological sea change Germany was experiencing at the time.
Following the failure of the "evangelization of the Orient", which had been promoted by Prussia since the foundation of a deaconess motherhouse in Smyrna in 1851, the German Empire under Bismarck pursued a regional strategy of "strengthening the German identity".
The aim of the material and ideological strengthening of German communities was not so much the subjugation of the region, but rather a peaceful penetration that would facilitate the assertion of the Empire's interests with the help of resident Germans.
Change of strategy
The imminent disintegration of the Ottoman Empire eventually brought about another change in Germany's colonial strategy. The policy of strengthening German communities was replaced in the years leading up to World War I with a "colonisation of the upper classes". The hope was that this strategy would give the German Empire lasting influence.
The long-term connections and the germanophilia in the senior ranks of the Ottoman military – both of which survived the war – illustrate the enduring consequences of this rethink in Germany's policy towards the Ottoman Empire.
Furhmann's portrayal of the numerous projects that were initiated by the Germans in the Aegean after the 1850s highlights the historic background to these changing strategies. The lack of direct political and military control over plantations in the Mediterranean certainly never proved to be a strategic weakness.
From today's perspective, it is exactly the non-military nature of Germany's strategy that was responsible for the good reputation of German-Ottoman relations.
Despite the variety of the means it employed, the German Empire considered itself to be on a "civilising mission" in the Mediterranean – a competition it was determined to win ahead of its European rivals.
Götz Nordbruch
© Qantara.de 2006
Translated from the German by Aingeal Flanagan
Malte Fuhrmann's book, "Der Traum vom deutschen Orient. Zwei deutsche Kolonien im Osmanischen Reich 1951-1918", has been published in German by Campus (Frankfurt, 2006, 419 pages)
Qantara.de
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