The Primacy of Unreason
In an interview with the Zeitschrift für KulturAustausch, Khalil Samir analyses the background to the growth of fundamentalism in Muslim countries and describes the frustration felt by many Muslims when they see how Europe responds.
Khalil Samir, when people in this part of the world are talking about Islam, "reason" is not necessarily the first word that comes to mind. Yet you say that Islam, in its heyday, was distinguished by its aspirations towards rationality and logic. Can you expand on this?
Samir Khalil Samir: In its Golden Age, in the 9th and 10th centuries – during the so-called "Islamic Renaissance" – the Islamic world was indeed distinguished by "the primacy of reason". The question, "What is logical?" led to a great openness in the discussion between Muslims and the West. For some time now, however, people have been using religion as a foundation for politics, science and society. Their credo: "Islam is the solution!" This is where it starts to become irrational and fundamentalist – and fatally, it's always done by appealing to the Koran. For the Koran and the Hadiths – the collected deeds and sayings of Mohammed – are astonishingly multifaceted.
In principle, one can take from these books whatever one happens to need and ignore the rest; Mohammed's advocacy of democracy and debate, say, or his clear demand that people should acquire knowledge. The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928, has always been particularly good at producing one-sided interpretations of Islam. When people are miserable or desperate, they're happy to believe what they're told. "The economy's in a mess? Islam is the solution!" Why? Because in the Koran it says that the rich have a duty to help the poor. In this way, it is really possible to find an answer to any problem.
Obviously it works, even though the Muslim Brotherhood is a strictly forbidden organisation even in the Arab world.
Khalil Samir: The more they are repressed, the stronger they become. Not because of their arguments, but thanks to their repressors, the Arab leaders and the West. For all sides are oppressing the Arabs, instead of acting according to the – inherently valuable – principles of the Koran. In the mid-50s, Sayyed Qutb Ibrahim Husain Shadhili, former leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, wrote a six-volume commentary on the Koran. His book was entitled, "In the Shadow of Islam", and he wrote it after spending 18 months studying in the United States. It had been the most traumatic period of his entire life.
To him, the USA was the devil. He simply couldn't get over the fact that – as he saw it – the world's most powerful nation was interested only in suppressing other countries, politically and economically. This experience was the basis for his theory of the "neo-jahiliya". "Jahiliya" is the term used to denote pre-Islamic times, when the Arabs were still heathens who rejected Islam. So, according to Sayyed Qutb, we are currently living in a neo-heathen epoch that refuses to follow the good Islamic path.
And as the Muslim Brothers cling to the Islamic past, they have to oppose today's heathenism in the same way as Mohammed once did – in armed struggle?
Khalil Samir: Yes. "Takfir wa al-Hidjra": "Call them heathens, and then withdraw." What does this mean? Even Arabs often don't know the answer. When Mohammed was confronted with the heathens of Mecca, he simply withdrew from them and went to Medina. Then he returned to Mecca, this time armed. But before he attacked the heathens, he asked them three times whether they wanted to convert to Islam. Only after they had replied three times in the negative did he attack them. With this, he gave Islam clear rules for the conduct of war.
First of all, the declaration to the unbelievers and the withdrawal from them - a withdrawal that gives the believer time to fortify himself against the infidel, i.e. to arm himself. Then the infidel is given three chances to recant and join the faithful. After three refusals, the attack takes place. Today, a sub-grouping of the extremist movement "Gama'a al-Islamiya" actually calls itself "Takfir wa al-Hidjra". Naturally, they don't observe these rules of war. But it's important to understand what once formed the background to this idea of retreat – and to realise that it's now undergoing a revival all over the Arab world.
In Damascus today, one sees a remarkable number of veiled women, certainly more than in recent years. Syria was always comparatively liberal in this respect - much more open than Egypt, for example. But in the last year or so, something seems to have changed. Many Muslim women are not merely wearing a headscarf; they have positively vanished under long, opaque veils. They even wear black gloves, so that not even the tiniest part of their skin can be seen. Is this, too, a kind of retreat or withdrawal? And does it indicate that some kind of an attack is in the offing, on the pattern you've described?
Khalil Samir: The time has not yet come for a concerted attack on so-called infidels. At the moment, we are still in the "retreat" stage.
If and when Islamists do attack, who is likely to be the target?
Khalil Samir: First of all, their own governments. The Islamists know that the Arab Christians believe in God; so they count as believers, even if their faith is "imperfect". But to the Islamists, the worst of all are those who claim to be Muslims yet don't live according to the Sharia – the Islamic law based on the Koran. The Muslim Brotherhood declared war on such Muslims decades ago.
In Egypt, they murdered the Prime Minister, Mahmud Fahmi an-Nuqrashi, and attempted to assassinate Nasser. In Syria, they rose up against the dictator Assad at the start of the Eighties; in1982, he obliterated them in Hama. But they reformed; and for decades, they've been smuggling their ideas into Algeria. In their eyes, all Arab regimes, without exception, are "munafiqun": hypocrites.
The attacks in Riyadh in May of last year took place at a time when the United States were announcing the removal of their troops. It was as if the time had come to act against the regime collaborating with the Americans…
Khalil Samir: The Saudi Arabian regime would be the first up against the wall if the extremists were to gain power. After oil prices exploded in 1973, the Saudi monarchy accumulated a vast amount of wealth. Then they squandered billions of petrodollars on their own highly dubious private pleasures. At the same time, they tried to build a facade of Muslim piety by contributing billions to religious schemes and religious charities - above all to "Da'ua", the propagation of Islam in Koran schools. In fact, their money mainly benefited the Wahhabi fundamentalists, whose most prominent representative is Osama bin Laden.
The Wahhabis have controlled school curricula for decades. They subject Saudi youth to a drip-feed of fanaticism and xenophobia, and they yearn for a return to the original, pristine Islam. In this respect, their vision resembles that of the Muslim Brotherhood, the difference being that the Wahhabis have a great deal of money. For reasons of pure self-interest, the Saudi regime opposes all terrorism - and now it has bred a multi-tentacled terrorist monster, which regards that very regime as its bitterest enemy.
The attacks in Riyadh took place in areas populated mainly by foreigners. It's clear that the fundamentalists sense a threat to their religion from foreigners as such. But how do they see Arab Christians? As stooges and lackeys of Washington?
Khalil Samir: In Lebanon certainly not. In Syria and Egypt too, the situation remains calm, so far. The Christians of the Arab world have adopted a very clear stance against the Iraq war. The Pope's attitude has strengthened them in this, all the more so as he spoke out not just against the Iraq war, but against war in general.
And how does the Islamic world – as opposed to the Islamists – see Western Christians? You once said that the Arabs' former admiration of the West has now completely died away.
Khalil Samir: Yes, because they can't see that the West has any principles at all any more. The United States, for example, famously want to teach us democracy. Aha, say the Arabs; and what about Kyoto? Why are you the only ones who are allowed to pollute the environment with paying? And why are you, and nobody else, allowed to have nuclear bombs? And why is all right for you to use your veto constantly, and then to scream blue murder when France wants to use its veto for once? And why is Israel allowed to violate an endless series of UNO resolutions, while Syria is not even permitted to cough loudly? The Arabs don't understand much about the Western way of life because they aren't acquainted with it.
Thanks to satellite dishes, most Arabs "learn" about the West via sex-and-crime movies, which give them an enduringly twisted image of the West. They see a society without honour and without values; and, to top it all, this image is then thoroughly demonised by the fundamentalists. Should the actual behaviour of the West – for example, of the US – do anything to confirm this demonic image, the result is "Takfir": the conviction that one is dealing with a society of infidels from whom one has to keep one's distance. And I'm afraid this process of withdrawal is already well underway.
Does this also apply to Europe – and, in particular, to Germany?
Khalil Samir: To most Arabs, Europe doesn't look demonic but merely enfeebled. Germany especially appears to have no guts, no backbone, and thus to positively abet the Islamist groups on its own doorstep. Instead of providing Muslims with clear guidelines for integration, Germany simply leaves them in a ghetto situation – a hospitable environment for all those who demand tolerance while themselves pushing intolerant ideas. Germans do indeed tend towards a model of "multiculturalism" that is not so much romantic as neutral, indifferent to values. They are inhibited about expressing any kind of criticism of alien cultures; instead of taking an objective but self-confident stance, they simply say nothing.
But look at the speech given by Federal President Johannes Rau in May 2000: "Without fear, without dreams: living together in Germany." The need for clear rules governing integration could hardly have been stressed with more self-assurance or more objectivity. He made it quite clear that all immigrants to Germany would have to accept the democratically-established rules, and that no-one could deactivate these rules simply by pointing to their own ethnic origins or religious convictions.
Khalil Samir: Universally-valid laws are a good thing. But are they respected by all Muslims in Germany? And what about the Germans themselves? Do they have the courage to live their own democracy? Three million Muslims live in Germany. If they had all really integrated themselves into this secular society and if the Germans were more self-assured - not dodging the issue by escaping into a risky tolerance or an equally risky distance – then there would be nothing to prevent some real, open, rational dialogue.
Rational dialogue about what?
Khalil Samir: First of all: Islam itself is not something anyone should be frightened of. Islamism is, however – although it, in its turn, should not be equated with terrorism. The task is to look very closely at the various groupings in Germany and to distinguish them carefully from one another. Germany is secular, but the Islamic organisations in Germany are not, as a rule. Their system is based on the unity of religion and state, the principle of "Din wa daula". There's nothing wrong with this, but of course the German state can't tolerate two legal systems, its own and the Sharia, side-by-side. This should be a matter of public debate.
Above all, one has to find out whether or not the majority of German Muslims are in favour of two laws – and to see whether they are even familiar with Germany's constitution, its Basic Law. Perhaps educational work is necessary even at this level. For example, the Islamic associations favour a strict separation of the sexes, and this is in conflict with the Basic Law. Until recently, "Hizb ut-Tahrir" was represented at the Frankfurt Book Fair. I find this alarming, as we're talking about an organisation that's banned in all Islamic countries, that approves the use of violence and deliberately seeks out individual recruits. Hizb ut-Tahrir has been forbidden in Germany since 2003, but why did it take so long? With its excessive tolerance, Germany could become a playground for Islamists. That doesn't help the country, and it doesn't help its Muslim citizens.
In what areas do German Muslims require more help?
Khalil Samir: Let's take the notorious headscarf. More and more Muslim women in Germany are wearing it, and this frightens or angers Germans, although they do not address the topic directly and matter-of-factly. Yet this has nothing to do with assimilation or with an attack on religious liberties. Nowhere in the Koran is there any clear mention of a duty to cover the head. Only 30 years ago, most Muslim women all over the world did not wear a headscarf. Real faith requires no visible symbols. In this case, however, we're not talking about real faith, but about fundamentalist repression.
Right now, in Germany too, many Muslims are looking for something to hold on to, and they think they can find it in such apparent solutions. Germans will have to resist this more strongly and actively. They must demonstrate, by the way they live, what a functioning democracy actually looks like. This would also provide a lifeline to Muslims trying to find a firm footing in their adopted homeland. It would be a good basis for a respectful but open dialogue between Germans and Muslim immigrants.
But the Germans don't even dare to ask questions. It seems to me that German democracy is not really strongly rooted. Germany has a weak ego, so to speak. But how should Germany play its role amongst the democratic nations, how should it make its contribution to the development of mankind, if the country doesn't know what it is?
In addressing the question of German identity, you're putting your finger on a wound that still hasn't healed. What with post-war reconstruction, the conflicting aims of the victorious Allied powers and the still-ongoing process of reunification, Germans have not yet achieved a genuine identity.
Khalil Samir: No, the only identities they've allowed themselves have been political and economic. Everything else was a taboo subject. And now the danger is that these taboos might lead to a lack of preventive measures against fundamentalist tendencies. This would also be fatal for Muslims. After September 11th and the absurd equation, "Islam = terrorism", many Muslims were so hurt in their self-image that they became susceptible to "comforting" Islamist slogans. Thus the West's false image of Islam became a self-fulfilling prophecy; and in Germany, the extreme right found that people were prepared to listen to them once again.
What you're describing is two different, damaged identities or self-images facing each other across a divide. But as long as the very phrase "German identity" is tainted with the whiff of nationalism, there is no point in calling on the German people to "strengthen their ego". It's simply asking too much of them. Maybe it's not always possible for outsiders to understand this.
Khalil Samir: But there is no way around this debate. No society, and especially no multicultural society, can survive and remain healthy when it defines itself mainly in terms of "economic patriotism". Particularly when the basis - the strong economy – is crumbling away! Nor is loyalty to the constitution enough as long as it's only a mental attitude, with the heart a mere vacuum or filled with fear. Under such circumstances, individuals would have no moral motivation to defend democracy forcefully.
The German people will themselves conduct this debate, hopefully on as broad a basis as possible. As an Arab, I can only say this: Arabs admire Germany above all for its civilised, democratic values: equality, human rights, freedom and peace. To us, these are the European values, and thus also the values we associate with Germany. That's why it's so disappointing when Germany fails to uphold these values stalwartly, and instead hides behind self-doubt and a false idea of harmony.
Samir Khalil Samir was interviewed by Mona Sarkis.
© Zeitschrift für KulturAustausch 2003
Translation from German: Patrick Lanagan
Khalil Samir is the Director of the "Centre de Documentation et de Recherches Arabes Chrétiennes" in Beirut