Hashemi Rafsanjani – The Least Common Denominator

On May 10th, Hashemi Rafsanjani, the second most powerful man in the Islamic Republic of Iran, announced at the last minute that he would run for president in the upcoming elections. His statement outlining the reasons for his decision does not exactly open any promising new horizons or raise great expectations, but instead reveals the anxiety at the present state of his country felt by this seasoned politician, who acted as parliamentary speaker for nine years and can already look back on two terms as president.

The lack of a compelling campaign platform is something he has in common with his rivals. For the first time in the over 25 years of the Islamic Republic, none of the candidates for president, no matter from which wing, is able to put forward a platform capable of inspiring confidence and hope in a major portion of the population.

The impoverishment of Iran's political philosophy

Another new aspect of these elections is that neither the fundamentalists nor the reformists, the two main wings of the government, have as yet been able to agree on a candidate.

Despite the impoverishment of political philosophy in Iran, the two major political currents always managed during the last 100 years to win the support of large sections of the populace by advocating high-flown ideals.

"Parliamentary government" at the time of the constitutional revolution, "restoration of the former greatness of Iran" under Reza Shah, "liberation of the petroleum industry from the hands of the English" under Mossadegh, "land reform, women's suffrage and a share in the profits for workers" under Mohammed Reza Shah, and "Islamic government" under Khomeini were the visions and promises that moved the masses.

Forward-looking concepts of the past

In the last 26 years as well, candidates for president went canvassing for votes with appealing, forward-looking concepts in their arsenal. Bani Sadr promised to establish an Islamic economy, Rajavi envisioned greater power for the poor and disenfranchised, Khamenei, the present spiritual leader, heralded victory in the war against Iraq, Rafsanjani stood for reconstruction and the privatization of the economy after the war, and Khatami espoused an Islamic democracy.

These are the kind of promises that allowed candidates to win a majority of votes. But, one by one, all of these concepts and ideas came to nothing. Khatami's program enjoyed the overwhelming support of the people and the European Union. After eight years in office, however, he has not managed to push through either democracy – the main demand of the people – or the end Iran's nuclear program, nor has he cut off support for Palestine's terrorist organizations – the main concern of the European Union.

Concept of Islamic democracy in Iran has disappeared

This failure on the part of the religious reformist has caused the project of realizing democracy within the scope of the Islamic constitution, and while upholding the prevailing political structure, to disappear into the annals of history. Some of those who once ardently supported this idea are now striving instead for a fundamental change in the constitution or at least amendments to some of its central articles.

According to the Islamic constitution, the Guardian Council, whose fundamentalist members are appointed by the spiritual leader, has the right to reject candidates for parliamentary and presidential elections and to veto bills proposed by parliament.

The role of the supreme leader

In foreign policy and domestic security, as well as on important issues like nuclear policy, the supreme leader still has the last word. He appoints the military and police commanders, the chief justice, the director of the broadcasting institute, the chairmen of the powerful and wealthy foundations, and the Friday imams, the influential clergy representatives in each city.

He also has the right to depose the president. In addition to the spiritual leader, the great ayatollahs, the religious universities and the Friday imams are also able to put president and cabinet out of commission.

Khatami and the sixth parliament, in which reformists are in the majority, already came up against these constitutional iron walls when they embarked on the first elementary attempts to carry out reforms and pass new laws. In one of his more recent speeches, Khatami himself declared that the president is a service provider charged merely with executing the programs and ideas of others.

Reformists' rapprochement with the fundamentalists

In practice, the fear of burgeoning liberal and non-religious democratic currents has pushed the reformists to seek a rapprochement with the fundamentalists. And this in turn has ultimately led the majority of the population, caught up in the midst of an economic crisis, to lose their faith in reforms carried out in the context of the existing constitution and to turn away in disillusionment from the religious reformists.

This goes especially for youth, who long for greater freedom along the lines of the Western model, and women, who are subject to multilayered forms of discrimination. Since most people did not turn out at the polls at the last parliamentary and city council elections, the fundamentalists were able to grab the majority vote.

Now, the reformists are not only confronted with the disappointment of the people, which alone could spell their downfall at the presidential elections; they are also struggling with two additional obstacles: the lack of attractive concepts and of a popular figurehead.

The dilemma of the reformists

The most far-reaching program the reform parties can offer is the continuation of Khatami's reforms, which have long since run out of steam. When Hossein Mosawi, the wartime prime minister under Khomeini, decided not to run, the reformists were unable to settle on a common candidate.

The more radical reformists proposed Mustafa Moin, Khatami's minister of science, while the moderate camp backed Mehdi Karubi, president of the last parliament. Both have failed to gain widespread popularity, and their campaign claims are limited to a lackluster rendition of Khatami's failed program and unfulfilled promises.

Fully expecting the defeat of their ticket, some of the leading reformists are now putting their weight behind Rafsanjani. This group hopes that Rafsanjani will make use of his personal influence and power to prevent the unrestrained dominance of the fundamentalists in the executive branch of government, and to mitigate the fundamentalist hard line, at least with regard to the economy and international relations.

The fundamentalists have been equally unsuccessful in their efforts to put forward a joint candidate. Ali Akbar Welayati, foreign minister during Rafsanjani's presidency; Ali Larijani, the broadcasting director and the supreme leader's deputy on the National Security Council; Mahmood Ahmadi Neshad, fundamentalist mayor of Teheran, who is accused of murdering oppositional intellectuals; Baqer Qalibaf and Mohsen Rezai, commanders of the Revolutionary Guard, have all tried and failed to establish themselves as the conservative-wing contender.

The platform trumpeted by both radical and moderate fundamentalists consists of the old familiar slogans of the Islamic Republic – resistance against Western dominance, commitment to helping the poor and disenfranchised, the fight against corruption, and other incessantly repeated phrases, which only serve today to trigger the aversion of the populace.

Rafsanjani's reasons for running

In the first announcement of his candidacy, Rafsanjani cited the country's growing inner divisions, the increasing strength of extremist forces, the people's disillusionment with the Islamic system, the critical position of the region in the international arena, and the widespread doubts as to the fitness of the Islamic system as his reasons for running for president.

A look at the day-to-day reality in the country confirms his concerns. Iran is plagued today by frequent urban unrest and strikes by workers, white-collar employees and students. Some branches of the military are dreaming of a putsch, while the majority of the people would be glad to witness the overthrow of the Islamic Republic. In foreign policy terms, Iran's resistance to the Middle East peace plan, skepticism regarding its nuclear program, and the stationing of American troops on its southern, eastern and western borders place the country in an awkward situation.

In his latest interviews, Rafsanjani promised to work on a détente with America – something the majority of Iran's people desire – and to push forward privatization while loosening social restraints.

Rafsanjani, who believes in despotism in politics and liberalism for the economy, has gained a reputation among his countrymen for pragmatism, conspiratorial arrangements, the murder of dissidents, and an affinity for corruption. He enjoys the support of most Islamic technocrats and bureaucrats, as well as some of the fundamentalists and reformists.

Nevertheless, with his shadowed past, his repetition of the same old empty promises and the repudiation of the Islamic system by the majority of Iranis, he is now faced with a difficult challenge.

Faraj Sarkohi

© Qantara.de 2005

Translated from German by Jennifer Taylor-Gaida

Qantara.de

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