A More Positive Evaluation for Kunduz and Takhar

In 2007 and 2009 in the provinces of Kunduz and Takhar in the northeast of Afghanistan, you asked local people for their appraisal of the international mission. The results of the survey for the Free University of Berlin show a surprisingly positive assessment of this involvement.

Jan Koehler: Yes, I was also somewhat surprised by the results myself, because I had previously carried out research in the east of Afghanistan where international troops were viewed by local people as more a part of the security problem than part of a solution to it. Any advance supplies of trust that had been placed in the intervention even as late as 2004, had been used up there.

And that's why we were astonished that in the survey carried out in Kunduz and Takhar in 2007, 95 percent of households declared that the security situation had improved over the last two years, and 80 percent attributed this improvement to the international military presence.

Does the second round of surveys show a change in the attitude of the population to foreign forces?

Koehler: In the 2009 survey, the initial results of which are currently being evaluated, the statements on security were rather more subdued, as the impression was that attacks in the province of Kunduz had increased, and that pressure from external forces on the local population had grown, whereas it was actually village residents who worked for the government who were being threatened.

This explains the rather less positive assessment of the security situation, although it should be stressed that like the 2007 survey, respondents still reported an improvement and gave a positive assessment of the contribution of international troops to security.

What explanations are there for this positive appraisal of the mission?

Koehler: An important point is that the northeast has never known a Pax Talibana. It is frequently forgotten today, but originally the Taliban was a movement for peace that took on the commanders who had established a violent regime in many parts of the country.

But unlike in other parts of the country, the Taliban never succeeded in asserting its power and laws in the northeast, because the Northern Alliance held on there right to the end. So the power of the commanders in the region was unbroken. It was international troops that ended their tyranny after 2001.

Does this mean the foreign presence is not perceived as foreign rule?

Koehler: An explanation of a former Taliban leader is insightful in this regard: He said to me that basically, people in the northeast also had a problem with the foreign military presence, but that they were also aware of the fact that if the Germans left now, then first the commanders would be at each others' throats again, and then they would attack former supporters of the Taliban, just as they did after 2001.

Not that this means that people share the value system of the foreign military. This is also backed up by the surveys in which 43 percent said the military presence presented a threat to Islamic values and local standards.

To what extent are the results from both provinces, which are located in the relatively peaceful and stable northeast, also applicable to the rest of the country?

Koehler: They are of course only applicable to a limited extent, because a real war is raging in other regions. But on the other hand, the study shows that contrary to an image increasingly propagated in some media and in politics, there are indeed provinces where peace has been successfully restored. Ultimately, one cannot view the country as a whole, but one must assess the situation from province to province on an individual basis.

Are there lessons to be learned from the study for other parts of the country?

Koehler: We repeatedly heard a positive assessment of the demeanor of German troops, namely that although our Afghan interlocutors thought the soldiers would easily be able to utilize their power indiscriminately and without restraint, they do not do so. This is in total contrast to local commanders or – in the perception of large areas of Afghanistan – US troops. Abduction and collateral damage being the key words here.

German fears of being accused of cowardice are after all that we have heard, unfounded at least as far as the local population is concerned. Although we have heard criticisms from Afghan security forces that the Germans leave them to do the dirty work.

But shouldn't the Germans be taking stronger action against local rulers if they are going to assert the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force?

​​Koehler:The German strategy is to safeguard Afghan forces and support them, but otherwise make sure German forces are not in the front line. The Germans made a conscious decision not to jeopardize long-term acceptance among the local population with short-term advantages. They would definitely have the means to fight back against rocket attacks on their base by destroying the positions from which the rockets were fired. But because they know that this would not be possible without causing civilian deaths, they leave it be.

Does the success of the mission also harbor its failure, or in other words what are the chances that the government will be replaced by an acting administration?

Koehler: It is indeed a problem that apart from in the formal education sector, all improvements in the developmental sector cannot be attributed to the country's own government, but to foreign aid workers and soldiers. Particularly if local authorities are inefficient and corrupt, there is a great temptation for development organizations just to completely sidestep local structures and carry out their projects alone. And of course there is not much sense in that, if one wants to strengthen administrative structures on the ground.

What can international agents do to integrate the Afghan government more fully in the development process?

Koehler: It is a fundamental problem of development policy that foreign agents are only accountable to their employers and not to the local population. And employers are only interested in measurable results, not in the indirect but often just as important effects on government culture and society. Nevertheless there are innovative efforts, also in the northeast, to involve local state institutions and communities in transparent application and allocation procedures in the overall development process.

In your view, what has to happen to stabilize the country in the long-term?

Koehler:A possible scenario is that Afghanistan remains a client state financially and militarily dependent on foreign governments, a state with little legitimacy with respect to the population, and correspondingly unstable.

Another conceivable scenario is that a government is established that is recognized by the population, a government that succeeds in asserting itself against local rulers. This would however probably be a state with strong Islamic components, which may not necessarily match our perceptions of democracy and the rule of law.

Interview Ulrich von Schwerin

© Qantara.de 2009

Jan Koehler is a researcher working on the special subject of "Governance in regions of limited state control" at Berlin's Free University.

Qantara.de

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