Cultural Affiliation through Sectarian Politics

There is no doubt that the parties on the Iraqi political scene today, which staunchly define themselves along sectarian lines, have a crucial role in fueling the social division in Iraqi society; however, they should not be held responsible for all the evil.

Other factors, prior to the current situation, have contributed to the discord such as the structural erosion of the Iraqi state, the pursuing of an ethnic policy on the part of the government, the absence of freedom, the decline of the economy and of education – all these are factors that have paved the way to the current sectarian division and have contributed to shaping it.

Iraqi society today expresses its cultural affiliation mainly through sectarian politics. These parties, for their own survival and progression, are largely dependent on maintaining the cultural capital of these parochial and narrow communities that in the end form the popular base for these grass root parties.

Therefore, it is dangerous for them to entertain a discourse on multi-culturalism since that form of dialogue would shatter all notions of personal allegiance and would engender a competition in loyalty with the group and its political representative.

Factors influencing the sectarian atmosphere

It is to this conclusion that some of the pessimistic pundits issue a verdict on the future of Iraq as they consider all the variables of the situation on the ground. The direction of the country, in one form or another, is headed toward a geopolitical division.

What will emerge from the debris of one country once unified by an iron fist are three strong sectarian entities at the expense of a weak center that will act like a representative front established to engage on the diplomatic level with the international community.

From another angle, two other factors will contribute to the continuation of the current sectarian atmosphere: one, is the admittance of Iraq into the organization of free trade and, second, is fiscal and administrative corruption that will allow for the manipulation of the legal sector to the advantage of the ruling groups and the investment of public money in the interest of political groups that plan for long term hegemony and influence.

The privatization of the public sector and opening the door to private investment companies in various fields such as oil will contribute to the creation of national economic cartels that seek in the end to control and exert influence on the political elements and the parties that owe allegiance to it. What goes without saying here is the direct connection of money to politics and political parties.

The economy as the magic wand?

Many of the Iraqi pundits see that the above observations are already taking place. One need also introduce other variables that would counter that position in the Iraqi situation. The economy, which right now moves at snail pace, and suffers from decrepitude – that economy could be the magic wand that would overcome the current atmosphere of sectarian extremism.

It is clear that many of the Shi'ite and Sunni political structures are revived in times of crisis with media providing visibility by allowing them access to their support base throughout the difficult times of the past four years. Parties or political structures such as these will undergo severe curtailment if the security situation is stabilized.

​​Economy, as some optimists think, is the solution that can transcend the current conflict that largely feeds on the loss of hope which a large portion of Iraqi society is experiencing; not to mention unemployment, low education standards as a direct consequence of international sanctions and the neglect of the previous regime. The optimists can cite many examples from the experience of the past four years.

Before the Fallujah battles, the residential quarters in the city were the quietest for the single reason that its occupants were professionals: government employees, engineers, doctors, those engaged in scientific research and were on the whole representative of a cross section of Anbar society.

Their residential affiliation was not based on blood or tribal ties but on class and educational levels. Although many of these inhabitants opposed the American attack on the city, they also held the opposite camp responsible for instigating the futile battles that took place.

Despite the importance of the economic factor with its impact on development, the creation of job opportunities for the unemployed and on raising the standard of living for the general public thus affecting the current sectarian polarization – it does not provide all the answers.

The unresolved issue of Federalism

The lack of confidence between Iraqi social elements and their political representatives will continue to be active in the current absence of the state and its foundations.

Despite the many essential steps taken toward re-activating the political machinery we have not yet agreed to a final and permanent constitution, nor the establishment of an administrative body to implement the judiciary or security apparatus that would enable the citizen to establish a relationship with the state thus freeing him from the sectarian, ethnic or regional allegiances.

The citizen cannot fathom (nor maybe a lot of politicians as well) what the shape of the next Iraqi state will take. Despite the public declaration regarding Federalism no one still knows what form this federalism would look like, how many regions or states the coming Iraq will contain; what the position of oil will be, or Kirkuk, or Iraq after the withdraw of the American troops – a matter that appears to be increasingly likely from the current debates in the political corridors of America.

​​All these issues are extremely vague and have a large influence on the emergence of a nascent state in addition to affecting the compass of national allegiance that currently sees prudence in barricading oneself in a residential area within a homogeneous sectarian demarcation as long as the situation is unpredictable and unstable.

The common language that Iraqi politicians use today such as the need for a national unity or charging this or that politician with sectarianism; the loud voices of Friday sermon preachers across the nation that emphasize that "there is no difference between Sunni and Shi'ite and we are all Iraqis" appears to be too general and is irrelevant. This is because the current situation on the ground is of larger impact than the flowery language.

The possibility of a civil war in Iraq on the basis of sectarianism appears to be less feasible with time especially after we have moved beyond the dangerous crisis that resulted in the explosion of the Shrine, or the "Dome of the two Imams", in Samarra.

Though some politicians may benefit from the divisive continuation of sectarian violence as a type of opposition terrorism (even though they might not demonstrate it at all times), many are convinced of the extreme cost and loss that will be reaped should a civil war really take place.

Three decades of political death

It appears as if Iraq is undergoing a phase of political adolescence; it is meaningless to speak of an Iraqi political experiment after three decades of political death under the hegemony of the Ba'ath on Iraqi political culture and politics.

The experiment of four years of free political work, the discovering the size of the self in comparison to others, and the mentoring in the political game of equilibrium between citizens, media and power and so on.

These four years are merely the beginning and if we would be optimistic we would say that the current political sectarianism is the natural consequence to the absence of a profound political experience and that its fate would eventually be to fizzle out as other supporting elements step into political maturity.

If we, on the other hand, were pessimists, then a new Berlin Wall will emerge to separate Iraqi residential quarters along sectarian lines not unlike the partition in the south east Asian continent and the formation of two countries for Hindus and Muslims. This process – that of cleansing governorates and Iraqi cities of its multi-ethnic elements – began almost a year ago in Iraq and continues until today.

Those who believe in conspiracy theories would almost be sure that the process of forced transfer is done to the sectarian benefit of these regions and cities, a matter that will eventually make it easy to politically divide the nation along federalist lines.

Many regard this ethnic and sectarian cleansing – though it creates more Iraqi suffering on top of their current situation hoping that it would – in effect end and, for the last time, stop any contact between Sunni and Shi'ite.

This scenario, in the opinion of neutral observers, is the worst possible paradigm for a federalist regime while at the same time constituting one of the worst predicaments to the long history of Iraqi ethnic relations that has produced, despite fighting, power struggles and abrogation of rights, a wide margin of coexistence and represents a component to Iraqi identity.

Ahmad al-Sa'adawi

© Qantara 2007

Ahmad al-Sa'adawi is an Iraqi journalist living in Baghdad.

Translated from the Arabic by Mona Zaki

Qantara.de

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