For the People, the Country, and the Torah
In the first decades of Israeli history, religious groups and parties did not play a decisive role. In 1948 the state of Israel defined itself as Jewish and democratic. The Zionist founders of the nation understood Judaism first and foremost as a secular national movement, and only secondarily as a religion.
According to Hagemann, Zionism advanced to a civil religion that "considered the nation and not God as its main point of reference." The religious spectrum historically consisted of two main currents, as it still does today:
On the one hand there is Ultra-Orthodoxy, which follows the tradition of Sephardic Orthodoxy in the Jewish Diaspora. Their ideal is the Eastern European "Shtetl," a community of devout Jews closed off from the rest of the world, which they continue to practice in Israel as a self-chosen ghetto.
Ultra-Orthodox Jews do not serve in the army, devoting their lives instead to the study of the Talmud. They thus embody everything that Zionism scorns, while at the same time rejecting Zionism – because only God can bring salvation, not a state created by man. Hagemann refers to a "fundamentalism of fleeing from the world."
The radical settlers' movement
A "fundamentalism of ruling the world," on the other hand, describes messianic fundamentalism. Its adherents are politically active and extremely nationalistic. For them, Jews are a "chosen people." The moral dictates of other nations do not apply to them; they are subject only to God's commandments.
The nationalistic religionists experienced their first upswing following the takeover of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967. Their religious perspective allowed them to justify their claim to the "Holy Land" (which secular Zionists could not morally justify). Their activist potential led to the founding of the radical settlers' movement Gush Emunim in 1974.
The power of this group suddenly grew when the rightist Likud party became the strongest political force in Israel in 1977 and Menachem Begin was elected Prime Minister. Religious groups increasingly moved from the margins to the center of Israeli society, and in doing so changed both society and themselves.
According to the author, fundamentalist movements are generally not as unchanging as they like to portray themselves. They are part of modernity in so far as they react to modernity, as well as to their political and cultural environment. They thereby develop a considerable potential for innovation.
Modern politics of tradition
For all practical purposes, Ultra-Orthodox Jews (Charedim) have long recognized the state they officially repudiate. They are also dependent upon the state, which pays for their religious schools, for example. As society has become more religious, the Charedim have used the opportunity to exert influence.
They are represented politically by the Ultra-Orthodox Shas party. This party's followers are often poor Oriental Jews (Misrachim). Socio-economic conflicts are interpreted as cultural differences – a typical way in which fundamentalists try to win over new followers.
Ultra-Orthodox Jews have thus become more active and nationalist, moving closer to the messianic fundamentalists. "Similar to messianic fundamentalism, Shas claims to be a representative of 'true Zionism' based in the triad of the country, the people, and the Torah."
At the same time, Gush Emunim not only emphasizes political influence, but also increasingly spiritual renewal. Zionism has been "desecularized" and infused with religion. As Hagemann describes it, "Messianic fundamentalism sees itself as a religious revitalization of pioneer Zionism."
Both religious currents thus refer to Israel as a country (Eretz Yisrael with the historical Biblical borders), not as a state.
Gaza – the victim of Israeli class struggle
For this reason, one of the biggest setbacks to settler fundamentalism and Ultra-Orthodoxy is the withdrawal from Gaza. Israel’s borders are a hotly contested issue in the Jewish state – regardless of whether the debate is about the geographical borders that have not yet been definitively drawn, or when speaking of the boundaries of Israel’s collective identity.
Both settlers and Charedim oppose the withdrawal from Gaza – for not only ideological, but also socio-economic reasons. The poor and those with a low income (represented by a disproportionate number of Oriental Jews) profit from the occupation, for example via affordable housing in the settlements. For them, the Gaza withdrawal poses a threat.
Their perception is that this threat issues from Israel's secular Ashkenazi middle class. It is this group of educated Israelis of European heritage who profit from economic revival in the region. They thus largely favor peace with the Palestinians because peace would have a positive effect on the economy. Settlers and the poor have forged a coalition along ethnic lines that serves as a counter-force to this group.
The opposition between Ultra-Orthodoxy and the settlers' messianic fundamentalism no longer exists, says the author. They have more in common than they have differences. "Ultra-Orthodoxy and the settler movement are united in their rejection of the post-Zionist vision of Israeli society, which is based in universal principles and promotes the state of Israel as a state for all its citizens. (…) They share the neo-Zionist vision of an ethnic-religious theocracy (…)."
Steffen Hagemann provides detailed scientific evidence for the above. He does not extrapolate any further conclusions, however. But anyone who gives it some thought can deduce from the facts presented how great the anti-democratic potential currently is in Israeli society.
Beate Hinrichs
© Qantara.de 2006
Translated from the German by Christina White
Qantara.de
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