Getting Beyond the Dialogue of the Deaf

The Arab world is marked by polarisation: between the elites and the masses, between town and country, between rich and poor. Development will not be possible as long as this polarisation exists. As the Lebanese writer Karam al-Helou notes, this blockade of progress threatens to destroy the Arab world from inside

The forty years since the epoch-making Arab defeat in the Six Day War in 1967 have provided enough evidence of the huge gulf which exists between the elites and the broad masses of the people in the Arab world – a gulf which is so deep that it has resulted in each side rejecting and separating itself from the other.

The latest wars – in 2006 in Lebanon and early 2009 in Gaza – have given further evidence of the gulf, with the failures of communication which result and the almost complete lack of involvement of either side with the other.

The masses expected what seemed to them to be obvious: that their elites would position themselves in fundamental opposition to the wars. But the elites themselves didn't even think of such an option. Instead they dismissed both conflicts as the work of chaotic daredevils.

The enmities and conflicts which exist between the elites, who hold all the important positions in political, economic and cultural life, and the masses became visible once more.

The authoritarian state and domination by the elites

The relationship between the elites and the people is most clear in the authoritarian state, which is the most widely spread political system in the Arab world, and in which the population is seen as a permanent source of unrest and a threat to the maintenance of the existing power structure.

As a result, the state surrounds itself with secret services, special commandos and other special forces, and it spies energetically on any development which could perhaps end up out of its control. The aim is to stifle any opinion which fails to praise the "achievements" and "great deeds" of the authoritarian state, or goes as far as to criticise them. Any strengthening of civil society is seen as a danger for the tyrannical omnipotence of the regime.

The political elite sees the masses as a mob of limited intelligence which has to be dominated: the people have to accept the plans and policies of the elite without complaining. That includes going to war if the elites feel like it, even when war is crazy. The people have to accept the consequences of war with humility and without complaint.

This is seen as a kind of holy duty for the benefit of the whole Arab nation, even when the consequences in reality are devastating. In the same way, the masses must accept a peace without complaint if its suits the elite, even if it means the abandonment of all the nationalist and pan-Arab principles contained in their slogans.

The masses submit to their fate

In return, the masses see the power of the elites as an inevitable fate with which they have to come to terms with gritted teeth.

The relationship between political parties and the people is no different. Parties are usually not the expression of the will of the people. They are rather impregnable fortresses or small garrisons for people with rigid views on the edge of society, who barricade themselves in their refuges against the real troubles, hopes and fears of the majority.

Neither side listens to the other. It's a dialogue of the deaf. It's easy to see how fragile the political parties are. In most Arab countries they have little influence on the masses and they show themselves unable to penetrate into their consciousness.

In Egypt, for example, only two percent of the population belong to a party. Meanwhile the parties present themselves as the head and the heart of society, as its spiritual and nationalist vanguard.

The Arab parties see the masses as a huge herd of blind sheep which they can lead in one direction or the other as it pleases them. The parties have as a result become the unloved stall-holders in a market of ideologies. That has led to this gulf between them and a damaging alienation of the parties from the people.

And there's another gulf – a gulf within the parties themselves, between the leadership and the membership. It is no exaggeration to describe this as a highly worrying development.

In the world of the wealthy

But perhaps it is the gap between the worlds of the rich and the poor which is a particular cause for concern. The gap has been becoming wider since the middle of the last century, as the middle class has gradually disappeared.

The wealthy follow the mass movements with suspicion and concern as they demand social justice, but they have virtually no real interest in the Arab world's army of 100 million poor and illiterate and its 14 million unemployed.

​​Meanwhile, the masses bear a silent grudge as they wait for the moment of opportunity when their frustration can be released in a clash with the wealthy elites. While they remain trapped in their poverty and misery, the rich roll in luxury, piling up their huge wealth in foreign bank accounts. The rich are unable to imagine in their wildest dreams that they could use this wealth to develop their society or to help the needy, who, plagued by hunger, illiteracy and unemployment, just manage to keep their heads above water.

There's the same gulf between the intellectual elite and the masses. The intellectuals consider themselves superior, and see the masses as inferior and incompetent, so that it is their prophetic mission to treat them in a patronising fashion.

More recently, the gulf has widened to such an extent that the intellectuals discuss new, pragmatic reforms, while the masses are moving in the other direction and lose themselves in the irrational illusions of superstition.

And finally, there's another elite which plays a role in the Arab world: the leaders of the various religious and tribal groups who stand against any reform or development.

This gulf can only be understood in the context of the polarities which exist in the Arab world: between rulers and rules, town and country, rich and poor, the masses and the intellectuals, modernism and traditionalism. If these contradictions are not removed or at least moderated, the Arab world threatens to destroy itself from within.

Karam al-Helou

© Qantara 2009

The Lebanese author and journalist writes for various Arabic media outlets, such as 'Al-Hayat' and 'An-Nahar'.

Translation: Michael Lawton

Qantara.de

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