Completely Innocent?

Current negotiation on the Iranian nuclear program have raised questions as to what extent German companies have been involved. Peter Philipp discussed the matter with Mark Higgs, an internationally renowned expert on nuclear issues

In an effort concurrent with the ongoing row about Iranian nuclear policy, German authorities have intensified measures to uncover any commercial links between German companies and suppliers and the Iranian atomic sector. Just a few weeks ago, authorities conducted a large, countrywide raid on 44 companies, yet without finding any truly new evidence. A German television broadcast soon afterwards reported how, for years, Iranian buyers have been purchasing important components for their nuclear program.

One of the suspected sellers is currently facing court proceedings in Mannheim. He is accused of being involved in the sale to Libya of restricted materials used in nuclear programs.

There is no contradiction posed by the fact that Germany is also one of the most prominent members of the international front protesting Iran's nuclear intentions, claims Mark Hibbs, an internationally renowned expert on nuclear issues living in Bonn. This is because the German position on proliferation issues has fundamentally changed in recent years.

"Germany's role became less significant in the 1990s. We know that throughout the 1980s, German industry, with the support of weak government export control policies, enabled a number of states, including Iraq, to purchase large supplies of materials and machinery needed to build nuclear weapons. By the end of the 80s and into the early 90s, when the true extent of the nuclear program became apparent, the German government intervened and was very successful in putting a halt to most of this trade."

"We then saw during the 1990s that German trade in illegal weapons and 'dual use' technology with Iraq and Iran drastically declined. Occasional cases of German proliferation have come to light, but these appear to involve the cooperation of a third country that arranges purchases for states such as Pakistan, Iran, and Libya. This method of proliferation is very difficult to prove."

Iran as part of Germany's sphere of influence

Here is how the scheme works. A company in Russia orders machines or parts in Germany. The export document declares the goods as being for civilian use and the export is subsequently approved. The goods, however, do not remain in Russia, but are transported along dubious channels to another country, which never received an export permit, because that country is presumed to harbor prohibited nuclear ambitions. Iran is such a case in the current conflict.

"I think there are two sides to the coin here," says Mark Hibbs. "The first issue is a matter of how well the German export control authorities and the security service are doing their job. Here, I have no doubt that there is a serious commitment to stop such activities and halt any proliferation on the part of German companies. The government knows that if even a single case of nuclear technology is found to be exported by a German company to a country like Iran, then Germany's diplomatic standing and reputation could be seriously damaged."

A completely different issue, however, is how German politicians and German business behave in general with respect to Iran. They are not prepared to put pressure on Iran and regard the country as part of Germany's sphere of influence. They do not want to place German business interests in the region at risk.

German weapons preferred by arms purchasers

One problem is the "Russian component." Moscow quickly moved in to Iran quite early to continue the nuclear projects begun by Germany that were halted after the revolution. Russia cooperates with authorities in Tehran that are simultaneously responsible for the peaceful as well as military uses of atomic power. It is practically impossible to establish in advance the exact intended use of deliveries to Iran. Despite this, the German authorities are doing their utmost to track down suspicious business dealings, with only moderate success, as Mark Hibbs explains.

"In some of the few, but important cases, the offender is threatened with the charge of treason, as state secrets concerning the German uranium enrichment program have been passed on to a foreign state outside of the EU. What we have seen is that it is tremendously difficult for the German authorities to really prove this serious charge. In some cases, they have to resort to less serious charges, such as export violations, which, at most, bring a one to two year prison sentence for first time offenders."

Despite all of these efforts, interest remains high among arms buyers for German goods due to their advanced technology and high quality. Many of the individual components needed for weapons programs cannot be automatically classified as being for military use, as they can just as well be used for peaceful purposes. Trade and export regulations within the EU and with Eastern Europe have been greatly eased over recent years, so, of course, the danger that certain good could end up in the wrong hands has grown considerably.

Peter Philipp

Translated from the German by John Bergeron

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