Qantara: The pace of the arms race between Morocco and Algeria has escalated. Rabat has acquired Israeli F-16 aircraft and the Skylock Dome anti-drone system, while Algeria has reinforced its air force with Russian Su-35 aircraft. What are the motives behind this competition?

Hicham Mouatadid: The arms race between Morocco and Algeria cannot be understood in isolation from the political mindset that shapes their relationship. It is not a spur-of-the-moment development; rather, it is fueled by historical grievances and conflicting narratives around identity, sovereignty and regional influence. Every time one of the two countries concludes an arms deal, the other quickly follows suit, reinforcing the logic of mutual deterrence. But this balance is fragile and could devolve into open conflict if control is lost or mediation is absent. Ultimately, the fact remains that security is not built solely on equipment, but on trust and strategic integration. 

How do you assess Algeria's announcement of a general mobilisation draft law in April? 

The declaration of general mobilisation is more than just symbolic. It carries clear messages both domestically and internationally. Internally, it represents an attempt to reorganise the political landscape and promote alignment around the military establishment. Externally, it serves as a warning message in the context of escalating tensions with Morocco. There is no parallel political discourse that promotes de-escalation, which heightens the level of anticipation and concern in the region. 

What are the roots of the conflict, and how did it become linked to the issue of Western Sahara? 

The border dispute that culminated in the Sand War of 1963 marked the first significant expression of conflict over political identity. On one side stood a Moroccan monarchy that sees the pledge of allegiance (bayʿa) as a source of sovereign legitimacy. On the other side was the Algerian republican regime, which was grounded in revolutionary legitimacy and which understood the principle of self-determination as an extension of its revolutionary ideology and its historical commitment to armed struggle. 

This ideological divide would later be reflected in Algeria's support for the Polisario movement in the Western Sahara conflict. For Morocco, this conflict is central to its historical, religious and constitutional legitimacy. 

These lingering tensions were soon reinforced by the absence of official communication, as well as by media and educational policies in both countries that entrenched the image of the other as an enemy. In Algerian discourse, Morocco is portrayed as an expansionist power and a Western arm in the region, while in Moroccan discourse, the Algerian regime is presented as a closed system controlled by the generals of the old regime (i.e., the military personnel who dominated the Algerian scene during the Black Decade of the 1990s until the era of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika). These stereotypes accumulate year after year, posing challenges to any potential reconciliation. Overcoming them requires an integrative historical and cultural project that rewrites the Maghrebi narrative on shared foundations. 

Moroccan-Algerian tensions have extended to neighbouring Tunisia. Morocco withdrew its ambassador from Tunisia in August 2022 after Tunisian President Kais Saied received Polisario Front leader Brahim Ghali. What is behind this dispute?  

This diplomatic rift may offer Algeria an opportunity to weaken Rabat’s regional alliances, but that is not necessarily the main driver behind recent developments. Tunisia's move appeared rooted in sovereign decision-making, yet it failed to account for the sensitivity of the regional context.

There are other dynamics at play in Tunisia, both the declining influence of the French role and the involvement of new powers such as China and Turkey. However, there is still hope for Arab or African mediation to break the ice and restore normal relations. 

Tensions have also cast a shadow over the wider Sahel region, where relations between Mali and Algeria have deteriorated, despite Algeria's role as a mediator between the Malian government and the Azawad movements in the north in 2015. How do you view the growing regional dimension of the rivalry? 

Regional relations were on a collision course following the 2021 coup in Mali and the rise of a transitional authority that promoted a sovereign discourse rejecting foreign interference. The crisis reached its peak when Algeria was implicitly accused of supporting rebel factions in the north. This rift not only affects bilateral relations but also creates a security vacuum that could be exploited by extremist and transnational actors. What makes this dispute particularly dangerous is that it it has coincided with the absence of major international actors such as France and the decline of UN mediation.  

Algeria is increasingly concerned about the growing Russian influence in Mali, particularly through Wagner mercenaries, viewing it as a threat to its strategic depth and its southern borders. In response, it is seeking to restore its influence in the Sahel through various diplomatic and security initiatives. 

Meanwhile, Morocco is monitoring these shifts and adopting a pragmatic policy in its dealings with the Sahel countries, particularly Mali and Niger, through development projects and non-confrontational rhetoric. This has secured its position as a central actor in regional influence and mediation. 

On 17 June, Morocco signed a strategic partnership agreement for defence cooperation with Ethiopia. How do you view this step? 

This defence partnership is tied to Morocco's ambition to become a new-generation continental player, capable of influencing regional security and asserting itself as an actor in major African conflicts—whether in Libya, the Sahel or even Somalia. It represents a soft approach to power-building, aligned with the theory of "smart power", where defence diplomacy intersects with economics, politics, and culture to secure an advanced position on the global power map. 

Trump's envoy for Africa and the Middle East, Massad Boulos, has expressed his intention to visit  Algeria and Morocco to resolve the crisis between them. Is Washington an acceptable mediator for both parties, given its recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara? 

The upcoming visit reflects a growing American awareness of the need to contain the escalation before it becomes a regional crisis. Yet a central question remains: can Washington credibly act as a mediator, given that—at least from Algeria's perspective—it has compromised its neutrality?

The US administration is attempting to strike a rhetorical balance: it wants to remain a viable mediator without undermining Morocco's gains, particularly its recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara, while also avoiding further deterioration in relations with Algeria. 

Washington is betting on a broader strategic framework—one that integrates both countries into regional security efforts in the Sahel and counterterrorism cooperation, all while safeguarding its interests in the Western Mediterranean and across Africa.

Even so, while US mediation may calm the situation temporarily, it is not sufficient to formulate a lasting solution without the genuine political will of both parties.

How do you see the solution from your point of view?  

There have been many historical attempts to bridge the divide, whether through Arab mediation or bilateral coordination in the 1990s. Most of these initiatives failed due to a lack of political will and a tendency for media escalation over dialogue.

The solution cannot be purely technical or diplomatic; rather, it requires a comprehensive geopolitical approach that goes beyond the Western Sahara issue and redefines their relationship within a framework of constructive "competitive balance." This is especially important given the volatility and growing number of foreign interventions in the surrounding region.

Cooperation on issues such as border security, energy, or infrastructure could provide common ground for de-escalation, much as it did in Europe after the Second World War.

At the same time, parallel tracks (Track II diplomacy) are essential. Engaging cultural, economic and security elites to build informal communication channels can lay the groundwork for the resumption of formal dialogue. The solution is not impossible, but it requires political courage.