The Washington-Jerusalem consensus
When Donald Trump won the US election in 2016, many hoped that the event was a fluke; a temporary rebalancing of the American system, in which populism delivered a heart attack to the body politic of the USA.
For a while, historical events seemed to confirm the narrative. America recuperated and decisively delivered the White House in 2020 into the hands of an establishment figure, Joe Biden, consigning Trump's victory to the annals of history.
History may well record Trump-style "MAGAism" as something relatively uncommon in the history of American politics—but it is not an aberration, as Trump's second term demonstrates. For people across the Arab world, particularly in the occupied Palestinian territories, Lebanon and Syria, his inauguration raises countless questions about the future.
Over several decades, two standard points emerged as a veritable "Washington consensus" on Palestine/Israel. Firstly, Israeli sovereignty over the Arab territories it conquered in 1967—including the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza—was generally rejected, even if only rhetorically.
Secondly, the formula for a final peace settlement included a two-state solution, with a Palestinian state to be established alongside a secure Israel.
Trump's first term made it clear that he would not treat these points as inviolable. His administration moved the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, implicitly recognising Israel’s claim over an undivided capital in Jerusalem. Trump also recognised Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, Syrian territory that Israel occupied in 1967.
These were only the two most significant moves that demonstrated a lack of commitment to previous cardinal principles held by most US administrations of the past few decades.
Since Trump's election in November 2024, ministers in the Israeli government have been calling 2025 the "year of Israeli sovereignty" over the West Bank. And when it comes to the two-state solution, which was at the bedrock of American rhetoric for so many years, Israel has made it clear it has no intention of allowing one ever to emerge.
Skeptical optimism in the Gulf
Saudi Arabia and the Emirates hope to reap economic benefits from the Trump presidency. But the Gulf has learned that Washington cannot be relied upon. Meanwhile, the Saudis could push Trump to take a tougher stance towards Israel.
This is not simply a Netanyahu policy, but rather one that has now become an absolute consensus in Israeli politics, which has been shifting further and further to the right and the far right over the last 20 years.
The presence of Israeli military forces has increased dramatically across the occupied territories; that includes the West Bank as well as Gaza. In the former, de facto annexation of large parts of the occupied territory has already taken place.
During the Biden administration, there was already a rejection of the notion that American leverage should be used to force a change in Israeli behaviour. That pattern is likely to not only hold but intensify under the new Trump-led administration.
In fact, on Tuesday, the day after his inauguration, Trump issued an executive order lifting US sanctions that the Biden administration had placed on groups of Israeli settlers in the West Bank.
Will Trump support the ceasefire in Gaza?
The ceasefire deal between the Israelis and Hamas that came into effect last Sunday includes several phases. The first phase sees the release of some Israeli and Palestinian prisoners, but the complete withdrawal of IDF troops from Gaza would not take place until at least the second phase, while rebuilding of Gaza is not scheduled until the last phase.
There are serious concerns that without tremendous American pressure, Israel will not proceed to phases two or three at all—prior to the agreement, Israel made it very clear on multiple occasions that it has no intention of leaving the strip in the short to medium term.
The Israeli media discussed this quite openly, and within different parts of Gaza, the IDF had been extending roads, building outposts and establishing long-term infrastructure, none of which would be necessary if they were departing soon.
Netanyahu has stated that "security control" from "over the entire territory west of the Jordan River" is immutably Israel's right, and has rejected the idea of the Palestinian Authority (PA) returning to Gaza. In the absence of the PA, and due to the obvious rejection of Hamas, only vigilante Palestinian forces and the IDF are left to administer Gaza, which appears to be the case in much of the strip already. But even in the case of vigilante Palestinian forces, which include lawless gangs, there is deep Israeli control.
Trump’s choices for key members of his administration, likely to influence US-Israel relations, leave little room for imagination in that regard; Marco Rubio for Secretary of State, who has promised "steadfast support" for Israel; Mike Huckabee, a deeply ideological pick for US ambassador to Israel, who does not believe in the Palestinians as a people, nor in the West Bank as occupied territory; and Elise Stefanik as UN ambassador, a peculiar choice, given that Stefanik is incredibly critical of the UN itself, and due to her pro-Israel stances. Israel has a "biblical right to the entire West Bank", she said on Tuesday during her confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Trump is unlikely to push Netanyahu to withdraw IDF troops or force a decisive end to Israel's war on Gaza. What is more likely is that the current deal will succeed in accomplishing much of what is proposed in the first phase but will not result in the withdrawal of troops, nor the permanent cessation of hostilities.
Mission accomplished?
During his election campaign, some suggested that Trump’s overriding desire to be seen as a "dealmaker" and "peacemaker" could have a more transformative impact on US relations with Israel than might be otherwise apparent. According to this argument, Trump will not want to deal with a war while in office, particularly given his narrative over the past 4 years vis-à-vis the conflicts the US is already involved in.
Netanyahu, however, may simply provide Trump with a solution that gives both politicians what they need.
In 2004, following the US-led invasion of Iraq, George Bush stood on an aircraft carrier and declared "mission accomplished". Of course, the mission was not accomplished—but just as was true in 2004, the political benefits of now declaring "the war is over", even while maintaining an IDF presence throughout different areas of Gaza, would be worth the façade.
Such a "solution" would allow Trump to retain his "dealmaker" image, while Israel could proceed with its plans, permanently disrupting the notion of a Palestinian state and ending all hope for a withdrawal from the occupied territories.
All the above, however, remains contingent on one key factor—Trump's erratic nature. It is entirely possible that Trump could defy his own pattern, if only because he has shown a willingness to throw conventional wisdom to the wind in the past if he thinks it’s in his interests to do so.
Trump’s'unpredictable decision-making process could, theoretically, lead him to take a very different approach in the future—even one more informed by international law. But it’s far more likely that Gaza will remain the "graveyard of international law" and of the rules-based order, as well as tens of thousands of innocent Palestinians.
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What to expect in Lebanon and Syria
In contrast to the situation in Gaza, there are good reasons to expect that a genuine ceasefire will hold in Lebanon. The overriding interests of Israel and the US do not conflict in sustaining a ceasefire.
Israel is not interested in occupying and settling Lebanon, as much as it is interested in severely degrading Hezbollah and ensuring a dynamic that protects its northern territories from Hezbollah attacks. Over the last few months, the former appears to have been accomplished; the latter is likely to come because of a political process.
Moreover, with the new presidency of Joseph Aoun and the appointment of a new prime minister in Nawaf Salam, Lebanon can start afresh, with considerable support from the international community, including Washington. Nevertheless, in the event the Israelis feel they need to return to bombing Lebanon to finalise the degradation process, they will do so, with impunity and without respect for international law, before returning to negotiations.
The question for the Lebanese will be how to resist demands that impinge on the sovereignty of the Lebanese state. The Trump administration is likely to push for the continuation of the current political dynamic in Lebanon, which includes the further marginalisation of Hezbollah. As the reform agenda in the country—which it desperately needs—also happens to coincide with a weakening of Hezbollah's power, there may be convergence between Beirut and DC that Lebanon can capitalise on.
Finally, there is the burning question that many have asked since December—what will the Trump administration’s policy be on Syria? How will it respond to the new authorities in Damascus that overthrew Bashar al-Assad? How will it engage on the Kurdish question, given that the Kurdish-dominated SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) are coming under renewed pressure and have enjoyed American support for so long?
The frank answer to all these queries in Syria is simply: unknown. Trump has expressed a desire to have American troops out of Syria, but that was before Assad was pushed from power. Some speculate that his good relationship with Turkish President Erdoğan may influence his position going forward, but these are, precisely, speculations. To put it bluntly, Syria has not mattered much to Trump before, and as such there are few indications of how he will respond.
Certainly, America’s closest ally, Israel, is deeply sceptical about the new authorities in Damascus, seizing the opportunity to further invade and add to the portion of Syrian territory it occupies. That does not mean that Trump will see an antagonistic relationship with Damascus as necessarily in his interest. Only time will tell.
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