Turkey's Military - Ready for the EU ?
“Forward, March!” – the Turkish military sees EU membership as an opportunity to modernize the country
Ever since the victory of the Party for Development and Progress (known by its Turkish acronym, AKP) in November 2002, the prevailing assessment -- particularly in the German media – of the situation in Turkey has gone something like this: With the AKP, reform efforts have received additional momentum, while the military and bureaucracy are slowing the EU integration process down, if not in fact torpedoing it. But as inappropriate as it may be to award a clean bill of health to the AKP, a party whose faithful were just a few years ago clamoring for an Islamic revolution, it seems ignorant to accuse the Turkish military of sabotaging Turkey’s effort to gain membership in the EU. To be sure, some forces within the state apparatus are intent on maintaining their own privileges, but as an institution, the military advocates joining the European Union. This is clear not only from the repeated statements of high-ranking generals, it is also apparent in the latest actions taken by the Turkish government. Precisely because the military still enjoys such a dominant status in Turkey, it would have been impossible to push through the constitutional revision of the summer of 2002, as well as other reform measures that have been announced, without the consent of the military. This is also true of the decision last year to repeal the state of emergency in the Kurdish provinces. That status had become unnecessary after the end of the PKK’s armed struggle.
The Turkish military has carried out three coups since the republic was founded in 1923 – with various consequences: When middle-ranking officers carried out a coup in May, 1960, it led to the most democratic constitution in the country’s history. On the other hand, the revolt organized by Turkey’s generals in September, 1980, caused extreme repression while at the same time promoting the liberalization of the economy and the Islamisation of society in an effort to weaken the left’s cultural influence for years to come. The last time the military intervened was in February, 1997: Without having to resort to the use of tanks, it forced the Islamist prime minister Necmettin Erbakan from office – the relationship between the army and the Islamists had now changed.
Europe: The last, great hope?
Turkey’s request for membership in the European Union dates back to 1987, a time when the military was in an even more influential position than it is today. Then as now, the Turkish establishment viewed joining Europe as the suitable expression of a European identity they saw themselves possessing since the final phase of the Ottoman Empire, and particularly of the modernization the country had undergone since the founding of the republic.
In addition to these ideological reasons, there were economic ones: In the 1980s, expanding capital, aggregating particularly in the country’s metropolitan areas as a result of Turgut Özals liberalization policies, clamored for access to the EU. This situation has not changed; on the contrary: The Turkish economy today is even more closely intertwined with the European Union. A tariffs union has existed since 1996, and so far Ankara has been losing money in the deal: The Turkish trade deficit was nearly € 11.2 billion in the year 2001, a considerable portion of which arose from trade with EU countries. Because Turkey is the first and only non-member country to have entered into a tariffs union with the EU, it receives no financial assistance from Brussels. This situation alone would be reason enough for Turkey to be interested in EU membership.
In the meantime, the Anatolian capital that funded the organizing of the Islamist Welfare Party in the 1990s and is now represented by the AKP also sees advantages in EU membership. And not only the AKP, nearly all factions covering the entire political spectrum now support the country’s integration into Europe. In the case of the Islamist and Kurdish movements, there is another important reason: Both movements expect the integration process to force the Turkish army from its prominent position in the country’s political system. Even some members of the left associate membership in the European Union with the hope of further democratization.
A large majority of the population expects EU membership to improve their own economic condition. There is also a widespread hope that visa requirements might be abolished. If prosperity doesn’t come to the Bosporous, at least they would be able to migrate toward prosperity. Yet of all the vague hopes circulating today, this is the one with the least substantiation – the government in Ankara declared as early as 1987 that should Turkey be approved for membership, it would relinquish for the time being the right of its citizens to move freely.
Still, it is in large part this longing glance toward Europe that enables the population to endure with little or no protest the consequences of the current economic crisis. In the view of the Turkish people, EU membership has come to mean more than a simple step to be taken for political, economic or ideological reasons. It has become the cement that holds together a society that finds itself, at the end of the political decade, in the middle of the worst economic crisis in its entire history, and can see no other way out.
If the hopes associated with the European Union are many and diverse, so too are the attitudes regarding the “duties and responsibilities resulting from membership,” as they are called in Eurospeak. For example, human rights activists, the left and the Kurds all demand compliance with EU standards concerning democracy and human rights. However, regarding the economic liberalization also demanded by Brussels, they are skeptical, if not downright opposed. The Turkish military, too, advocates EU membership, but wants to retain the option of intervening in the political process at any time it feels the government is going too far.
The Janissaries of the EU
Under the prevailing conditions, Turkey would – as the most populous state in the European Union – deserve corresponding representation on the boards and commissions of the EU. At the same time, as one of the poorest members, Turkey would stand to receive extensive subsidies and financial support from EU funds. These are solid arguments against Turkey’s membership – as opposed to the “cultural struggle” often alluded to by European (and in particular German) conservatives – if indeed Turkey should manage to fulfill the prerequisites for membership laid down at the Copenhagen Summit.
At the EU summit in Luxembourg in December, 1997, the European heads of state and foreign affairs had flatly denied Turkey’s request for membership. Two years later, however, at the Helsinki Summit, they acknowledged Turkey as a candidate for membership. The intervening two years had seen not only the replacement of Helmut Kohl’s government in Germany, which had been one of Europe’s most vehement opponents to granting Turkey full membership in the EU. The war in Kosovo had also demonstrated Europe’s military inadequacy. As a result, the EU in Helsinki voted to establish a military strike force. Both decisions taken at that summit illuminate Europe’s special interest in Turkey: both due to the strategic geographical location of Anatolia and because of the well trained Turkish army, which ranks second among NATO countries and sixth globally. For this reason, Turkey would primarily fulfill the role of a military outpost. Europe’s interest in pursuing a closer relationship, grounded as it is first and foremost in strategic and military considerations, makes it clear that in the long run, Brussels is not interested in weakening the Turkish military.
Deniz Yücel, Translation: Mark Rossman
© 2003 Qantara.de