Trust in the state is a precious commodity

In his most recent book, "Trust in Divided Societies: State, Institutions and Governance in Lebanon, Syria and Palestine", political scientist Abdalhadi Alijla writes that not culture, but the failure of state institutions is what is causing the crisis of statehood in the Middle East. In this interview with Tugrul von Mende, Alijla argues for the reconfiguration of incompetent state bodies as a means of regaining the public's trust

By Tugrul von Mende

In your book, your main argument is that state institutions play a crucial role in the general level of trust in divided societies. Looking at Lebanon, Syria and Palestine specifically, in what way do you think are these institutions in a crisis?

Abdalhadi Alijla: The institutions are in crisis because of the way they are designed, which fosters inequalities between individuals, classes, gender, ethnicities and groups. As a result, they also facilitate the informal institution of corruption within their respective societies. My work is part of an ongoing conversation and debate among researchers and scientists in sociology, political science, psychology and other disciplines. Despite the fact that institutions are the subject of much research in countries around the world, it seems that culture is always destined to be the main focus in the Middle East.

Trust in Divided Societies provides empirical evidence that the source of generalised distrust in divided societies is down neither to culture nor ethnic/sectarian divisions, but rather the institutions themselves, with all their attendant inequality, corruption, administrative arbitrariness and exploitation of power. My book is also an appeal to my colleagues to conduct more research into areas relating to the topic, either communities or in a different field of research.

Cover of Abdalhadi Alijla's book "Trust in Divided Societies: State, Institutions and Governance in Lebanon, Syria and Palestine" (source: Bloomsbury)
According to Abdalhadi Alijla, his book "provides empirical evidence that the source of generalised distrust in divided societies is down neither to culture nor ethnic/sectarian divisions, but rather the institutions themselves, with all their attendant inequality, corruption, administrative arbitrariness and exploitation of power"

Regarding Lebanon, you write that "the more unfair, unequal, corrupt institutions [are], the less likely people are to trust each other". How do you measure corruption as a factor for people's trust in or distrust of their government?

Alijla: Corruption per se is an informal institution that is found in almost every society, albeit in different forms and to different degrees. In my book, I refer not only to the international publicised rankings, but also to people's perception of corruption, which represents what they experience, what they hear and how they regard the services provided. People in Lebanon – and elsewhere – pay taxes; based on that, they expect to receive good services: security, safety, health care, education and so on. But in Lebanon, people do not receive fair treatment. They do not receive equal treatment. Take the country's infrastructure, for example. In some areas the roads are well made and maintained, but in other high-traffic areas they are not. The education system also displays inequalities.

How much did your understanding of the terms trust and distrust change while researching your book?

Alijla: Scientifically, trust remains that which it has always been. It is a virtue. It is about people not fearing they will be exploited by others and about the institutions that are supposed to protect and serve them. But when you are in the field as a researcher, things change. Trust can be manifested from different angles, reflecting different points of view.

In 2019, Saad Hariri resigned from his post amid mass-protests, but one year later, following the explosion in Beirut on 4 August, he was tasked with forming a new government. What are the implications of this development for trust-building in Lebanese society?

Alijla: It has nothing to do with the mutual trust between individuals and the people's trust in state institutions. It is part of a game played by the country's political elite for the benefit of regional and international audiences. Yet the people's demands remain highly relevant; they are calling for new institutions or the reform of those already in existence: judicial, political, security and social services. The problem is not only with the various political elites, but also with the institutions they have established. Regardless of whom they appoint – Hariri or anyone else – the people simply want, owing to the current economic and political crisis, to feel safe and secure.

Protester on the anniversary of the anti-government protests in Beirut (photo: Reuters/Emma Freiha)
According to Abdalhadi Alijla, "When the Lebanese took to the streets in October 2019, and the Lebanese political elites felt that the agreement was at risk, there was some indication that the world and regional powers might give the green light for change. That was when the elites responded. Things changed; since then there have been more arrests, more fearmongering, and more oppression". Pictured here: a protester on the anniversary of the anti-government protests in Beirut

Why are these three countries in crisis and why haven't state institutions been able to earn the trust of the people?

Alijla: The three case studies have one thing in common: dysfunctionalities of their formal institutions from the outset. Let's start with Syria: I argue that the civil war in Syria is not sectarian; instead, it has been sectarianised by the regime. And the civil war itself has not led to a low level of popular trust; it was already low, as a result of political corruption, oppression, a lack of free speech and free civil society organisations (CSOs). People honestly expected their relatives to be informants for the state security apparatus. Though afforded political power, the Kurds were oppressed culturally, while Arabs were given cultural rights, yet suffered political oppression.

In Lebanon, sectarian groups and political elites from the time of the civil war remain in power. The Ta’if agreement was not designed to be changed. All institutions set up since the end of the civil war have mostly been based on that agreement. Ta’if can only be changed if there is the international and regional will. When the Lebanese took to the streets in October 2019, and the Lebanese political elites felt that the agreement was at risk, there was some indication that the world and regional powers might give the green light for change. That was when the elites responded. Things changed; since then there have been more arrests, more fearmongering and more oppression.

Abdalhadi Alijla (photo: Patrick Mzaaber, Orient-Institut Beirut (OIB))
"It can be hard for researchers to separate themselves from their background and their emotional ties, especially if they have been politically active," says Abdalhadi Alijla (pictured here). "[…] I have been very careful in my choice of words, yet there can be no denying that a crime is being committed in Palestine against the current generation. My position here is with the people – with the young generation, and future generations"

In the Occupied Territories, the Oslo Accord created a fake middle class that benefits from the status quo. When Hamas won the election in 2007, the situation shifted considerably. Fearful of losing out, the PLO's privileged elites were shaken to the core. As a result, they rejected the democratic handover to Hamas and the new reality (with some support from the US). The division represented a continuation of the Oslo agreement – an extension both of taming the process of the political elites, and of the political parties, through these institutions. Both Hamas and Fatah are bound by the institutions that were established following the Oslo accord. Yet these institutions have been manipulated by the elites to serve them and their parties. These institutions have led to corruption and the creation of elitist CSOs, which have been used to replace formal institutions and deepen division, corruption and patrimonialism.

What role do state institutions play in building trust in these divided societies?

Alijla: Institutions are highly significant in building social capital and maintaining trust. Civil war and violence in divided societies are manifestations of the same causal factors that lead to low generalised trust. Civil society organisations and the judicial system are extremely important in any society that is looking to establish a high level of trust. These are perspectives that have not previously been subject to empirical testing. In divided societies there is a fundamental need for effective and equal institutions to keep conflicts and tension at a manageable level.

How relevant is your topic for understanding current political and societal realities in the Arab world?

Alijla: If we look around us, we will see manifestations of a lack of trust and vice versa. The current protests in the region are the result of a lack of trust in the institutions. We seem to be moving in a vicious circle of corruption, inequality, distrust in institutions, protests and sectarian tension, which continues to feed a generalised sense of mistrust. We need to examine existing levels of trust carefully and try to understand the institutions at work around us. If we continue to re-design our institutions yet fail to provide equal services and treatment for all citizens, with a reliable independent judiciary and independent CSOs, then society has no potential to develop.

How personal is this book for you as someone of Palestinian heritage? Did you encounter any difficulties when drawing a line between your personal background and your work as a researcher?

Alijla: It can be hard for researchers to separate themselves from their background and their emotional ties, especially if they have been politically active. I have always adopted a detached, academic position – I am very sensitive to the risks of bias. I have been very careful in my choice of words, yet there can be no denying that a crime is being committed in Palestine against the current generation. My position here is with the people – with the young generation, and future generations.

Interview by Tugrul von Mende

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