Will al-Sharaa naturalise foreign fighters and their children?

Aida*, a 28-year-old widow of a former foreign fighter, is still waiting for answers about her children's legal status. At present, they don't even have temporary identification documents in Syria, the only country they have ever known. Under Syrian law, women cannot pass nationality to children born to foreign fathers.

Ten years ago, Aida married an Uzbek fighter who had smuggled himself into Syria with the help of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The couple's first meeting with her husband was arranged by a woman who worked as a matchmaker (khattaba), seeking poor Syrian women to marry off to fighters. "She said he was kind and well-mannered, and my father agreed immediately," Aida, now living in Idlib, recounts. 

Over the three years they lived together, Aida gave birth to three children, including twins. In 2018, her husband went to battle and never returned. She was left without a marriage certificate and no proof of paternity for their children, which has prevented her from obtaining identification documents and enrolling her children in school. 

"To this day, I don't even know my husband's real name, or anything about his family or country," she says. "Even my children don't remember what he looked like." 

Now, months after the fall of Assad and the seizure of power by HTS and allied factions, Aida, like many Syrian women who married fighters and lost their husbands, is left wondering whether her children, who are currently considered to be of unknown parentage, will be eligible for citizenship. 

Integration through marriage

Syria's new regime has not amended the law that leaves Adai's children stateless. Even the special legislation enacted by the so-called Syrian Salvation Government, formed by HTS and governing Idlib between 2017 and 2024, failed to address this inequality, according to Heba Ezzedine al-Hajji, executive director of the NGO Equity and Empowerment, which has worked on the issue under Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's rule in Idlib. 

There are no official statistics on how many marriages between Syrian women and foreign fighters took place, but estimates suggest they number in the thousands. In 2018, the Syrian news site Enab Baladi documented approximately 1,750 marriages between Syrian women and foreign fighters. According to the report, 1,124 of these women had children, with a total of 1,826 children born from these marriages. 

"In many cases, women don’t know their husbands' real names, only assumed monikers [often borrowed from historical Islamic figures] like Abu Hajar or Abu Talha," says al-Hajji. 

While the Syrian Salvation Government, formed by HTS in Idlib in 2017, began issuing temporary ID cards to children of fighters, the responsibility for marriage and paternity documentation remained with the HTS judicial authority (referred to as Dar al-Kadaa). This authority keeps detailed records of fighters' identities but does not share them with civil society organisations, which complicates the legal recognition of marriages. 

Some women have been forced to turn to interim government courts in cities like Azaz or Afrin, where they are asked to provide unconventional proof, such as photographs or eyewitnesses, to verify their marriages. Failure to offer such evidence of the marriage may result in accusations of adultery, exposing them to severe legal and social consequences. 

The stigma faced by wives of HTS fighters has, however, been less harsh than that faced by the wives and children of ISIS fighters. Compared to ISIS, HTS kept its distance from civilian life and enjoyed broader societal acceptance. 

"The deepest impact is on the children themselves," al-Hajji emphasises, "because they have no papers, no access to schooling, no healthcare, and no right to move freely. Legally, they don't exist. If only women were allowed to pass on nationality to their children, that alone would secure their basic rights and ease the suffering of thousands of women."  

The jihadist path to Syria

The influx of foreign fighters into Syria began with the rise of jihadist movements around 2012. Their numbers surged after ISIS declared its caliphate in 2014, explains Hossam Jazmati, a journalist specialising in jihadist movements, to Qantara. 

According to Jazmati, the main motive for the influx was "religious fervour" as a result of the Assad regime's brutal crackdown on protests, which sparked widespread sympathy across the Arab and Islamic world. Religious leaders began issuing fatwas declaring jihad in Syria a religious duty. Heeding the call, fighters from East Asia, North Africa, and even Europe flocked to the country. 

Some fighters arrived alone, while others brought their families, forming self-contained communities. Jazmati notes that many struggled with cultural and language barriers, often settling in isolated enclaves such as the camp for French-speaking fighters or the Uyghur districts in Idlib Governorate. Others chose to marry Syrian women for religious and social reasons. 

A gesture of gratitude

In May, interim Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa announced that his government would consider granting citizenship to foreign fighters who had integrated into local communities, married Syrian women, and fathered children, after the adoption of a new constitution. The announcement sparked a wide-ranging public debate. 

For Jazmati, this proposal can be understood as an effort by the new regime to repay the favor to its foreign allies. Al-Sharaa, formerly the leader of HTS, had already declared the dissolution of all opposition factions in December, merging them under the umbrella of the Ministry of Defence. 

In June, the United States gave the green light to Syria's interim government regarding the absorption of approximately 3,500 foreign fighters, mostly Uyghurs and fighters from neighbouring countries, into the Syrian army. Naturalisation is expected to follow. 

Jazmati adds that the focus on the naturalisation of Uyghurs stems from HTS's longstanding alliance with the Turkistan Islamic Party, whose members fought in key battles. He further notes that many in Syria sympathised with the Uyghurs, who had fled religious persecution in China and sought a new homeland where they could safely practice their religion. Importantly, the group is not an internationally designated terrorist organisation. 

"Cross-border jihadist ideology"

Despite this, human rights advocates and activists have raised concerns about the motivations behind the naturalisation plans. Syrian lawyer and human rights activist Jalal al-Hamad warns, "If the goal is to shield these individuals from legal accountability or provide them with impunity, this is a blatant violation of justice."

He cites reports of some fighters' involvement in abuses even after the regime's collapse, particularly in Syria's coastal areas in March. "Citizenship should be granted through a transparent process based on social integration and lawful conduct, not as a political or military reward handed out behind closed doors."

Wahaj Azzam, editor-in-chief of the news platform Al-Dalil, also voiced his opposition to the proposal, arguing that it undermines the very idea of the nation-state and the possibility of building a military rooted in national identity. "These foreign fighters came with a cross-border jihadist ideology that doesn't even recognise the concept of the state," he says. 

He warns that naturalising them would embed them into Syria's political and social fabric without any accountability, further entrenching a culture of impunity. Still, he insists that their children, born in Syria to Syrian mothers, deserve civil rights and legal recognition. 

Meanwhile, Aida still waits. "My eldest is nine years old and hasn't gone to school," she says. "I've begged local sheikhs and commanders to help me register my children, but so far nothing has changed." 

*Name has been changed.

This is an edited translation of the Arabic original. Translation by Basyma Saad.