"The ceasefire is unsustainable without a vision for peace"
Qantara: When discussing the future of Palestine, it often seems like everything depends on Israel, Donald Trump and the Arab world—especially Saudi Arabia. But what about Palestinians? As a pollster, what can you tell us about their priorities?
Khalil Shikaki: Palestinians want a permanent end to the conflict with Israel. The ceasefire is just the beginning—they want all negotiations in Gaza to be part of the broader effort to end the conflict and to end Israeli occupation. They want to see transitional arrangements put in place as part of a larger vision for peace.
In my view, this peace should be based on a two-state solution. Although it doesn’t have the support of a majority right now, if a two-state solution were defined in a manner that meets the vital needs of Palestinians, they would support it.
The path to a new interim administration in Gaza is still unclear. The Palestinian Authority (PA) claims to be ready to assume full responsibility in post-war Gaza, something the Israeli government rejects. What should happen next?
The current Israeli coalition is unwilling to accept any transitional arrangements in Gaza that the Palestinians could agree to. It is also clear that the current Palestinian leadership lacks the trust of the Palestinian public.
The PA is not seen as a legitimate authority—there has not been a parliamentary election since 2006 and Mahmoud Abbas's presidential term should have ended more than fifteen years ago.
The difficulty for the PA is that if it wants to replace Hamas in Gaza, it must do so as part of an agreement with Hamas and in the context of a transitional phase with a clear understanding of what follows. The PA does not have the force to impose itself on the ground against Hamas's wishes.
Most Palestinians want to see transitional arrangements that could eventually lead to elections. But nothing will be sustainable unless the arrangements are part of a larger vision that ends with a two-state solution and regional peace. Without this vision, I doubt that any ceasefire will be sustainable.
Reclaiming the narrative of resistance
Palestinians have the right to defend themselves against Israel's occupation. But that doesn't have to mean following Hamas—a group whose political vision has resulted in Gaza's systematic destruction. It's time to envision a different future.
Do you think Hamas will continue to play a role in Gaza?
Hamas, in the absence of an agreement with other Palestinian factions on the governance of Gaza, will continue to assert its own control over Gaza—no doubt about that.
The question is: how do you disarm Hamas? Even if it agrees that a technocratic government should control Gaza for a certain period, it is unlikely to agree to disarm without a clear vision for a two-state solution that Palestinians and Israelis could agree to and would put us on the path to creating a Palestinian state.
There's a consensus among Palestinians, Hamas included, that this is what needs to be done: transitional arrangements, a strong prime minister, non-political institutions in control of Gaza, and elections in two or three years, beginning the process of reconstruction.
Do you expect a decrease in the popularity of Hamas now that a ceasefire is in place?
Right now, Hamas' popularity is not diminishing, it is probably increasing. But this is all temporary. Many people in Gaza and the West Bank support Hamas regardless of how they interpret the outcome of the war—but it is the minority, maybe 35 to 40 percent of Gaza’s population.
In the West Bank, there has been an increase in support for Hamas, but that support is more emotional than it is grounded in shared values. We expect Hamas’ popularity in the West Bank to return to pre-war level, which is about 20 percent.
Since 2006, when Hamas won 44 percent of the popular vote in Gaza, it has never reached that level in any of the surveys we have conducted. If there is peace between Palestinians and Israelis, support for Hamas will probably decrease further.
Who do you think could lead a transitional authority in Gaza?
I don't have a specific name. That is something that must be agreed upon by Fatah, Hamas and other factions. It would be someone respected by the majority of the Palestinian public. Somebody who is viewed as free of corruption. Not an authoritarian figure or a political figure.
The challenges facing Gaza require courageous leaders. But Marwan Barghouti, the most popular Fatah member, is in prison in Israel. Mohammed Dahlan and Nasser Kidwa, who still have a political base in Gaza, have been excluded from Fatah circles in Ramallah. Is there a leadership crisis in Palestine?
These are political figures, not the ones needed for the transitional arrangement. Barghouti, for example, could run for president after the transitional phase. Regardless of the name, the person who will have the authority to form a transitional government and communicate with the international community, who will begin reconstruction and prepare for elections, will have acceptance and legitimacy as the product of consensus.
We don't have a parliament right now, but such a consensus could provide a legitimate alternative in the eyes of the public, as long as it eventually leads to elections.
So, elections are the key?
Absolutely. If our politicians are not elected they will have no legitimacy to negotiate something as important and permanent as a peace agreement.
Skeptical optimism in the Gulf
Saudi Arabia and the Emirates hope to reap economic benefits from the Trump presidency. But the Gulf has learned that Washington cannot be relied upon. Meanwhile, the Saudis could push Trump to take a tougher stance towards Israel.
Netanyahu is currently visiting Trump in Washington. The two may find themselves at an impasse—Trump sees the ceasefire in Gaza as his success and wants it to hold, Netanyahu and his right-wing allies may push to resume the war before the ceasefire's second phase. Could Trump give a green light to annexation plans in the West Bank as a concession to the Israeli right?
That would be putting his own achievements at risk—particularly the Abraham Accords [agreements made in 2020 to normalise relations between Israel and several Arab states] and the Saudi normalisation process.
One of Trump’s goals will be to expand on what he did in his first term, which would require focusing, at least verbally, on trying to meet Saudi demands for normalisation—which may include commitment to a future Palestinian state.
At the same time, I am not necessarily saying that Trump will put any kind of pressure on the Israelis—we will find out soon how far Trump is willing to go. I am certainly not very optimistic that there will be American pressure on Netanyahu to agree to a two-state solution that meets the needs of the Palestinians.
Is there a Trump-Netanyahu consensus?
Trump's new administration could give Israel even greater freedom to pursue its territorial and political ambitions in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon, while the future of the ceasefire in Gaza hangs precariously in the balance.
Last week, Trump suggested moving 1.5 million Gazans to Egypt or Jordan. How seriously should we take this?
I don’t think Trump knows what he is talking about. That would destroy Israel’s peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt, who will fight tooth and nail against the idea of settling Palestinians in their countries. Jordan and Egypt are two of the most important U.S. allies in the region. It would be extremely destabilising.
It received an enthusiastic response from the Israeli right. Figures like Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir welcomed it as a step toward resettling in Gaza.
Sure, these extremists don't care about the future of the Jordanians, they want Jordan to be the homeland of the Palestinian people. They wouldn’t mind if Jordan collapsed if it meant they could get rid of the Palestinians in the West Bank. If they can push Gazans into Sinai, they don't care about the peace treaty Israel has with Egypt.
When will you do the next opinion poll in Gaza?
We are hoping to conduct one soon. But for a representative sample, we need to know where the population is. Right now, people are moving from one location to the other. Where will they settle? Will they return to their homes, even if they have been destroyed? Will they be guided to new shelters? In that case, we would be able to find out how many people are living in these shelters, create a sample and start conducting interviews.
I am still not optimistic that the ceasefire will hold. But if it does hold in the next few weeks, we should be able to do a new survey in both Gaza and the West Bank.
Do you still believe that "the horrors of October 7 and the following war will be transformed into a better future for Palestinians and Israelis alike"? I am quoting from your recent publication with Abdel Monem Said and Shai Feldman.
That reflects our hopes. We don't think it's impossible. We do believe that for Palestinians and Israelis, October 7 and the war in Gaza provide sufficient motivation to put the conflict behind them and to move forward.
When people conclude that this conflict must come to an end, they need to make sacrifices. They need to make concessions to each other.
We don't expect the current Israeli leadership to do that, nor do we see the current Palestinian leadership as capable of leading in that direction. But we do believe that the Palestinian public is both interested and willing.
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