Bound together by fate, history and migration

In October 2009, two years before the war in Syria began, then-Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu stood before Turkish and Syrian ministers and outlined his vision of unity. "From now on, as partners in destiny, history and future, Turkey and Syria will continue to walk the same path," he said. "We will walk hand in hand on this path. We will work together to make our region a rising centre of civilization again, to turn our region into a joint economic basin and reunite Gaziantep with Aleppo, Istanbul and Ankara with Damascus."

The ministers of both nations then attended two joint cabinet meetings, one in Syria's Aleppo and one right across the border in Gaziantep. Part of Aleppo Eyalet under the Ottoman Empire, Gaziantep had, by 2009, grown into one of Turkey's key industrial hubs. When war broke out in Syria, it became the Turkish city hosting the second-largest number of Syrian refugees.

The war seemed to destroy any hopes of a close relationship between the two countries, as Turkey actively opposed the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Today, following the fall of the dictator, Davutoğlu's vision appears tangible again. The flow of people, goods, and capital between the two nations is as robust as ever. But this rebuilding of ties has sparked fierce debates within Turkish society.

Five days after Assad's fall, Damascus’ iconic Umayyad Mosque was visited by Turkey's intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın. After praying, Kalın took the front seat of a car driven by Syria's new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Mohammed al-Golani. 

For some, the meeting between al-Sharaa and Kalın, and the fact that Turkey was the first country to have a visiting official in post-Assad Syria, was a victory. Others were outraged, insisting that no rebranding could erase al-Sharaa's past as a militant Islamist. The UN Security Council still classifies Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the group he led to power, as a terrorist organisation.

In January, in a seemingly harmless gesture of goodwill, Gaziantep's Mayor Fatma Şahin pledged that her municipality would provide new, dark red, 100% wool carpets for the Umayyad Mosque, personally picked by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Critics were outraged, arguing the gesture was inappropriate at a time when so many Turkish citizens struggle with a chronic cost-of-living crisis.

For secular Turkey, aligning with al-Sharaa's Syria threatens Turkey's foundational principles, emboldening radical elements and drawing the country into a dangerous entanglement with Islamist movements.

Despite the opposition's fears, during al-Shaara's visit to Ankara on 4 February, the two leaders pledged to strengthen their relationship, declaring the beginning of an enduring friendship and collaboration in a joint press conference.

Turkey's foreign policy taboo

Turkey's political landscape is polarised, not only over the cost of carpets or the name of the new leader, but on nearly every issue shaping its relations with Syria.

This divide cuts to the heart of how Turkey sees itself as a nation. When the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) rose to power in 2002, it was framed as the birth of a "new Turkey". Within this shift was a rejection of one of the main foreign policy pillars of the "old Turkey", which had avoided entanglement in Arab affairs. Today, the AKP still envisions Turkey as a major regional power—"big brother" to its neighbours and a leader in the Islamic world. 

Its opponents, however, have a different vision: a Western-oriented, secular Turkey, distanced from regional conflicts. The Republican People's Party (CHP), Turkey's main opposition party, has consistently advocated disengagement from Middle Eastern conflicts.

According to Professor Emre Erdoğan of Bilgi University, open debate of Turkish foreign policy is strongly discouraged in Turkey's political culture. Violating this taboo is often framed as a national security issue. 

"The government constantly speaks of Turkey's interests without clearly defining them and demands national unity. If you question whether an external threat exists, or its source, you are immediately branded a traitor," he told Qantara. He attributes this to the absence of independent think tanks, a compliant press, and academics who frame debates around national unity rather than objective analysis.

One key weakness of the opposition, according to Prof. Erdoğan, is its failure to propose an alternative foreign policy. Despite the CHP's membership in the Socialist International, it has never developed an internationalist or working-class approach to relations with Syria.

For many opposition voices, any move made by the Turkish government is automatically wrong. This criticism, Prof. Erdoğan argues, disregards the complexities of foreign policy, reducing it to a simple binary of "government equals bad."

Syria through a Turkish lens

When Turkish society does discuss Syria, it imposes its own fault lines. "We try to make sense of Syria based on our own internal divisions," Prof. Erdoğan points out, namely along Islamist-secular, Alawite-Sunni and Kurdish-Turkish lines.

Secular and religious factions clashed over a recent viral video in which Syria's new leader asked a young woman to cover her hair before taking a photo with him. Opposition media framed it as a warning sign that Syria was heading for a Taliban-like future, while pro-government outlets defended al-Sharaa, citing the woman’s statement, in which she thanked him for "liberating the country."

Likewise, the Syrian Sunni opposition’s defeat of the Alawite Assad thrust Turkey's own Sunni-Alawite tensions to the surface. Though Turkey's Alevis generally share little connection to the Syrian Alawites, social media erupted with accusations that Alevi and Alawite political actors in Turkey and Syria were conspiring against the revolution under orders from Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. Turkish Alevi organisations condemned such rhetoric as incitement.

Then there are the Kurds. Since 2016, Turkey has maintained a military presence in northern Syria, citing border security and counterterrorism. Its operations have primarily targeted the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)—designated as a terrorist organisation by Ankara, the US, and the EU—as well as its Syrian offshoot, the People's Protection Units (YPG).

Because foreign policy in Turkey is often framed in terms of security and counterterrorism, this narrative dominates discussions of Syria. In late January, tensions escalated inside Turkey when Siirt co-mayor Sofya Alağaş of the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Equality and Democracy (DEM) Party was sentenced to six years and three months in prison on charges of "membership of a terrorist organisation." 

Following the verdict, the government replaced the elected mayor with an appointed trusty. DEM Party Co-Chairwoman Tülay Hatimoğulları stressed that the ongoing political process requires confidence-building measures, including the release of imprisoned Kurdish politicians.

Unsurprisingly, security was a key topic of discussion during al-Shaara's visit to Ankara this month. Al-Shaara stated that the two leaders discussed various threats, while Erdoğan emphasised that Turkey is prepared to provide full support to Syria in its fight against "terrorist organisations".

Reconstruction and refugees' return

Assad's fall sparked optimism in Turkey about the economic benefits of a renewed relationship with Syria. In December, Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar highlighted Syria's oil and gas reserves, in a press conference, suggesting that Turkey could benefit from access to these resources. Many believe Turkey could play a leading role in rebuilding Syria, pushing up the stock prices of Turkish construction companies.

Others dismiss these aspirations as unrealistic, predicting Western and regional powers will block or try to restrain Turkey's influence. Opposition media were quick to highlight a meeting on 9 January in Rome between Italy, Germany, France and the US about the future of Syria, to which Turkey was not invited. 

In Turkey's highly polarised climate, the issue of Syrian refugees stands out as one of the few areas of consensus. Many Turkish citizens believe the long-term presence of millions of Syrians has strained the country's economy and society.

During her visit to Ankara in December, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced an additional €1 billion in funding, adding to the €10 billion the EU has already provided to Turkey to support Syrian refugees since 2011. Still, many saw this funding as insufficient. CHP party leader Özgür Özel argued that the country had lost a total of €200 billion due to the burden of hosting Syrian refugees.

Turkish media has been closely tracking the number of Syrians returning to their homeland since December. Both the government and the opposition want Syrians to leave—the government has advocated for an "honourable" return, while the opposition wants them out as soon as possible. 

This may not be as straightforward as it seems. Official data suggests that nearly 2.9 million Syrians have either integrated into Turkish society or are likely to remain in a wait-and-see position, uncertain about returning to an unstable Syria. 

Many Syrians will return, and in the future, could serve as an important bridge between the two countries. But a significant majority have built new lives in Turkey. Many of their children, born and raised in Turkey, attend Turkish schools and may not even speak Arabic.

During al-Shaara's visit, Erdoğan emphasised his belief that the voluntary return of Syrians would accelerate as the country becomes more stable. He stressed that every nation, particularly other Arab and Islamic countries, should do its part to support Syria's reconstruction.

Regardless of what the future holds, much of Davutoğlu's vision has already come true: Turkey and Syria are bound together by fate, history and migration. Whether they can once again become the heart of a thriving civilization, as Davutoğlu imagined, remains an open question.