Taming Syria’s rogue man

Western powers have come to realise that dislodging Syria’s Bashar al-Assad from his throne is costlier than had been assumed when the peaceful uprising began in 2011. After half a million deaths, the vast majority of which came at the hands of forces loyal to the Assad regime, tens of thousands of authentic photos evidencing industrial-scale torture in Assad’s dungeons and the displacement of half of the country’s population, an about-face seems to be taking hold in Western policy circles.

Assad's intransigence throughout the conflict is bearing fruit and Western countries are lowering their expectations – perhaps a change in behaviour is good enough for now. Conversation has recently focused on a more-for-more approach, a strategy in which small concessions, incrementally offered on the condition of reciprocity, are intended to lead to a mutually beneficial relationship that bridges the gap between Western objectives in Syria and those pursued by the leadership in Damascus. In December 2021, the U.N.’s Special Envoy for Syria, Geir Pedersen, said that he had had meetings in several Arab countries, as well as with the Americans and Europeans, and he thought that "there is a serious opportunity to discuss the possibility of implementing a step-by-step approach".

Currently, most countries opposing Assad want him to accept U.N. Resolution 2254, which, among other things, calls for fair elections, a new constitution, as well as credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance. However, Assad has refused to budge. The level of pressure applied has consistently fallen short of what is needed to force him into accepting the terms of Resolution 2254, which will ultimately push him out of power and potentially in prison. Given the agonising political deadlock, a new approach to resolving the Syrian conflict is indeed warranted. But could a more-for-more policy work with Assad?

Taming a master of deception

While Assad’s allies have significant leverage over him, he’s not – as is so often portrayed by those who despise him – a mere puppet. He is a master of deception. After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, for example, Assad’s intelligence agencies facilitated the passage of jihadists into the country’s western borderlands. In an attempt to limit U.S. regional ambitions, Assad helped turn the situation into a quagmire for the U.S. and its allies, while deceitfully attributing the transit of foreign fighters to the impossibility of controlling such porous borders, while drawing an analogy to the difficulty the U.S. faces when attempting to control the flow of migrants from Mexico. 

Additionally, during the first year of the civil unrest against his rule, Assad met two of the key demands of protesters: lifting the emergency laws that had been in place since 1963 and abolishing Article 8 of the Syrian Constitution, which stipulated that "the leading party in the society and the state is the Baath Party". In the years that followed, arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings of dissidents grew exponentially, with the share of parliamentary seats held by the Ba’ath Party increasing ever since. 

In 2013, after two years of extreme repression, the Assad regime, according to all reliable sources, began using chemical weapons to kill its own people. After allegedly handing over his entire stockpile of nerve agents under the auspices of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, his regime repeatedly launched chemical attacks, crossing the Obama administration’s "red line" against the use of chemical weapons. 

Assad will be hard to tame, as his history attests. Western policymakers should therefore proceed with caution. While a more-for-more approach is worth trying, four principles need to be applied while attempting its implementation.

1. Concessions

It must be ensured that policy objectives are met sustainably. Given Assad’s record for deception, his concessions must be verifiable and counter-concessions must be easily reversible. For example, lifting the Caesar Act, which is part of U.S. law, in exchange for a promise by Assad to release all living detainees is neither verifiable nor easily reversible. A more ideal scenario would involve, as a starting point, being given access to Assad’s prisons. Once the names of all living prisoners are verified, granting them amnesty could be done in exchange for lifting sanctions on financial transactions. These sanctions could be re-imposed were Assad to choose to rearrest the released detainees.

2. No free lunches 

In November 2021, a group of companies from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced an investment: a ten-year loan to build a solar power station near Damascus following the visit of the UAE’s foreign minister to Syria – the first of its kind since the conflict started. Similar steps have been taken that benefit Assad without any discernible concessions in exchange. For example, his regime has also been allowed to host the Arab Energy Conference in 2024. Giving concessions without receiving returns makes the more-for-more approach look like unconditional normalisation.

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3. Adopt an all-hands-on-deck approach

Western countries don’t view Syria as important enough to warrant giving meaningful concessions to Assad’s allies in exchange for ending the conflict. However, there exist some low cost, yet effective, policy changes that could increase Western leverage over Damascus. These changes include adopting an internally consistent, active and coordinated policy. Another policy improvement lies in using existing toolkits, such as sanctions, more efficiently.

4. Do it with a grand strategy in mind

The key risk in taking the more-for-more approach when dealing with Assad is using it as a stepping stone for a face-saving end to the conflict. A resolution that does not address the root causes – authoritarianism, brutality, sectarianism, inequality and corruption – is a recipe for perpetual instability. 

In neighbouring Lebanon, for example, much of today’s socio-political fragility is rooted in the country’s Taif agreement. Though the agreement ended the Civil War in 1990, it did so simply by tweaking the confessionally based power-sharing system and satisfying most of the country’s warlords, while doing very little to address more substantive issues. A lasting agreement that improves regional stability and ends human suffering is an agreement between the people or for the people, not the rival warlords who repress them.

The more-for-more approach can be used to jumpstart the deadlocked political process. It cannot, however, deliver a lasting and fair solution to the conflict in and of itself. Assad must go. He must ultimately accept UNSC resolution 2254 and be brought to justice. Any political action that does not keep this in mind in the long term is not only unfair to Syrians and humanity as a whole, but will plant the seeds for the next conflict in the region – once again leaving Syrians and the rest of the world to grapple with the consequences.

Karam Shaar

© sada | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2022

Karam Shaar is researcher-director at the Operations & Policy Center (OPC) in Ghazi Aintab, Turkey and a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute.

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