Who are Erdogan's allies?
Two major earthquakes rocked Turkey on 6 February, killing more than 50,000 people and injuring thousands more. Hundreds are still considered to be missing, while millions of earthquake victims have found temporary shelter with relatives and friends in other cities. The deadly earthquake and its aftermath will serve as the backdrop to Turkey's parliamentary and presidential elections on 14 May, which have the potential to upend Turkey's political landscape.
For the first time since taking office more than 20 years ago, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is not the favourite in the presidential race. During his two decades in office, first as prime minister, then as president, Erdogan has shaped the country like no other politician before him. He has changed legislation, moulding the Turkish state in his image. Since introducing the presidential system, he has ruled the country as a de facto autocrat, relegating parliament to insignificance.
Two months after the earthquake and one month before the vote, polls point to a close race between the government camp and the leading opposition alliance. Some institutes have predicted a defeat for Erdogan's electoral alliance. In the race for the presidency, Erdogan is trailing his main challenger, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who leads the largest opposition alliance.
Instrumentalising women's rights
Erdogan, however, remains an excellent tactician: he hasn't lost an election since 2002. What's more, he has also survived mass protests, including the 2013 Gezi Park demonstrations and an attempted coup in 2016. Even now, he knows how to look out for himself politically. The 69-year-old recently secured the support of small Islamist splinter parties for his electoral alliance, the People's Alliance – and they could tip the scales in a close race..
The New Welfare Party (YRP) recently joined Erdogan's People's Alliance. That party's demand to abolish Law 6284 – which obliges the state protect women from violence and, if necessary, guarantee them anonymity – has led to outrage in Turkey. At least 234 women in Turkey were victims of femicide in 2022, and the We Will Stop Femicide platform lists an additional 245 suspected cases
Laws protecting women have long been a thorn in the side of Islamist communities and parties in Turkey. They have blamed such laws for rising divorce rates, seeing them as an expression of Western interference in Muslim-Turkish family structures. These Islamic groups have put significant pressure on Erdogan's AKP government to reverse such laws. Just two years ago, Turkey withdrew from the international Istanbul Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence Against Women.
Conservative and ultranationalist allies
The addition of the YRP brings Erdogan's electoral alliance to four parties, the other three being the Islamic-conservative AKP, the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Great Unity Party (BBP). In Germany, constitutional protection authorities have been monitoring the structures of these three parties for years – though not the parties themselves.
The MHP and BBP are rooted in the nationalist "Ulkucu" movement, better known as the Grey Wolves. German authorities list the far-right organisation as ultranationalist, anti-Semitic and racist. Convinced of the superiority of the Turkish nation, they see Kurds, Jews, Armenians and Christians as their principal enemies. Their aim is a homogeneous state of all Turkic peoples – from the Balkans to western China – under Turkish leadership.
Erdogan's largest partner in the alliance, the MHP, is "the original organisation of the Grey Wolves", confirms Germany's Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV). The Federation of Turkish Democratic Idealist Associations in Germany represents the MHP's interests in Germany, according to the BfV. With 7,000 members, it is the largest umbrella organisation within the Grey Wolves group.
Erdogan's second major partner, the BBP, also has its roots in Grey Wolves' ideology. The party sees Islam as an important component of Turkish identity. The BBP is believed to be behind numerous political murders in Turkey, and its members are also alleged to have been involved in the 2007 assassination of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink. Its organisation in Germany, according to the BfV, is the Federation of World Order in Europe.
Erdogan's new partner, the YRP, is rooted in the ideology of Milli Gorus, whose structures are also under surveillance in Germany. It wants to replace the "Western order of injustice" with an Islamic "just order", according to the BfV. The YRP is currently polling at 0.8% to 2% of the vote.
The Islamist Huda-Par party – which, according to the North Rhine-Westphalia State Office for the Protection of the Constitution, is close to Turkish Hezbollah – also supports Erdogan. Back in the 1990s, Turkish Hezbollah tortured and murdered numerous human rights activists, businesspeople and politicians in Anatolia. According to German authorities, the group has 400 members in Germany and is also being monitored.
Government support for orthodox communities
In recent years, Erdogan has built up a strong power apparatus. He created his own elite by means of state contracts, nepotism and corruption, and endowed numerous Muslim orders with privileges. Should he lose the election, that elite would lose influence and wealth – which is presumably why Menzil, Turkey's largest orthodox Sufi order, recently announced its support for Erdogan's alliance.
According to the Austrian political scientist Thomas Schmidinger, Erdogan's electoral alliance is a combination of political Islam and ultranationalism. "Menzil, in particular, has already replaced the Gulen movement as one of the AKP's most important religious networks since the coup attempt in 2016," said Schmidinger, adding that it made sense for the order to try and defend its newfound privileges.
In 2016, the Turkish government declared the Gulen movement a terrorist organisation suspected of being behind the coup attempt on 15 July 2016. From the time Erdogan came to power in 2002 until 2016, the movement was an important AKP ally.
Should Erdogan win the vote on 14 May, Schmidinger does not expect any immediate political changes. Erdogan will likely continue to pursue an aggressive foreign policy to compensate for domestic problems, he said.
Schmidinger reiterated, however, that an election victory for the governing electoral alliance looks unlikely. Due to the failed economic policy and poor crisis management after the massive earthquakes in February, the AKP-led alliance is no longer backed by a majority of the electorate, he said. "Even in Turkey, elections can only be rigged to a certain extent," he added, referring to allegations of fraud in previous years.
Schmidinger said he doubted Erdogan would voluntarily concede the field in the event of a defeat. The Turkish state is, after all, largely controlled by Erdogan's cronies, he argued. Erdogan's followers have stocked up on weapons since the attempted coup, Schmidinger added, which could make armed conflicts possible. As a result, he said, even in the event of an election defeat, a change of regime might not go smoothly.
Elmas Topcu
© Deutsche Welle 2023