Hardly a match made in heaven
After the Second World War and with the beginning of the Cold War, the new world order drew clear boundaries between Iran and East Germany. West Germany, which developed at an incredible speed into one of the most powerful industrial countries in the world as a result of the "economic miracle", was of far greater interest to the Iranians than its impoverished eastern neighbour.
Moreover, the Federal Republic was determined to use its economic power to prevent other countries from establishing diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic. For years, the Hallstein Doctrine determined the fundamentals of West German foreign policy.
Another hurdle was that leading members of the Iranian Tudeh Party were based in East Germany. The communist party supported by the Soviet Union was critical of the Shah regime.
Despite all this, trade relations between Iran and the GDR did begin in 1952, albeit in modest form: as long as there were no diplomatic relations between the two countries, it was agreed that they should be considered unofficial and non-governmental. Although political pressure interrupted these relations several times, the volume of East German-Iran trade increased from 2.2 million to 10 million D-marks (West) between 1952 and 1959.
At the end of the 1950s, Iran's foreign policy changed. The country expanded its political relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist states such as Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and Czechoslovakia.
Radio "Peyke Iran" – a political scandal
In September 1959, the Iranian government once again called its economic relations with the GDR into question. The reason was the broadcasting of radio programmes by the Tudeh Party – "Radio Peyke Iran"–- from East Germany that could be received in Iran.
Surprised by the unexpected reaction from Iran, the GDR leadership prepared to send a delegation to Tehran. The delegation, however, was not granted an entry permit. Instead, Tehran increased political pressure on East Germany, so that trade relations between the two countries were limited to exchange transactions for several years after 1961.
It was not until 1965 that the first official economic talks took place. Iran proposed a normalisation of economic relations, but the old problem, "Radio Peyke Iran", not to mention articles criticising Iranian government policy in West German media, prevented a rapprochement. In November 1966 a new political ice age began between Tehran and East Berlin.
But economic talks continued nevertheless. The deputy chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, Gerhard Weiss, travelled to Tehran, and the permanent representative of the GDR in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance declared that his government was ready for further talks and for the signing of a trade agreement.
In March 1967, an Iranian delegation flew to East Berlin to discuss the sale of Iranian oil and the purchase of industrial goods from East Germany. The German side proposed further talks in Tehran. At an official meeting in the spring of 1968, the Iranians proposed a long-term contract for the sale of Iranian oil and promised a normalisation of relations. But although economic relations had now reached a remarkable level, the road to a stable political relationship was still long.
Alliance with the Iraqi arch-enemy
It was at this point that – from Tehran's point of view – the East Germans made an inexcusable foreign policy mistake, triggering a crisis in bilateral relations and almost bringing the volume of trade to a standstill: the German Democratic Republic fostered good relations with Iraq and, like other socialist countries, regarded Iranʹs neighbour as part of the anti-imperialist front.
East Berlin therefore stood behind Baghdad in the Iraq-Iranian border conflict. The Iranian Chamber of Commerce and Industry sharply condemned this in a statement and demanded an interruption of trade relations with the GDR. As a result, the volume of trade collapsed from 28 to 1.9 million marks between 1969 and 1972.The East Germans, who acknowledged their diplomatic "mistake", tried to revive the old relations in a variety of ways – for example, they unofficially invited the Iranian Economics Minister to Leipzig Fair during a visit to Moscow. However, the Iranian government declined the invitation.
Such stubbornness was to yield the desired result. In 1971, the government in East Berlin put its previous position into perspective in a diplomatic note. In it, the GDR greatly regretted the lack of trade relations with Iran. Siding with Baghdad had only been in the interests of calming the situation and avoiding imperialist interference, it was said. This letter put an end to the deadlock.
But by that time international conditions had also changed. West German foreign policy was no longer under the influence of the Hallstein Doctrine. Chancellor Willi Brandt (SPD) wanted to re-shape his country's foreign policy towards the socialist states. Both the Federal Republic and the GDR aspired to membership of the United Nations. On the other side was Iran, for whom the increase in the price of oil was flushing billions into its coffers. Tehran tried to profit as much as possible from the conflict between the Eastern and Western blocs.
Currying favour with the Shah
After East Germanyʹs climb-down concerning Iran and Iraq, the ambassadors of Iran and the German Democratic Republic began talks in Bucharest in September 1971 to improve diplomatic relations. These led to the establishment of diplomatic relations on 7 December 1972. Shortly before this, the government in East Berlin had instructed all GDR media to report neither on the Tudeh Party nor on the border conflict between Iran and Iraq.
From that day until the occupation of the Iranian embassy in East Berlin in February 1978 by activists of the Confederation of Iranian Students National Union (CISNU), bilateral relations improved steadily thanks to visits by high-ranking statesmen. By the end of 1978 the trade balance of the two countries amounted to more than 120 million D-marks.
Major projects designed to pave the way for the rich oil state Iran to become an industrial nation brought lucrative contracts for foreign partners. Iranian oil revenues quadrupled between 1969 and 1971, reaching the $5 billion mark and as much as $20 billion in 1976.
Iran's economic relations with the socialist states continued to improve. They competed with the capitalist states for Iran. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was a welcome guest. However, the closer Iran got to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the more Western states distanced themselves from it. At the same time, invitations from socialist states increased. Iran's last monarch travelled to Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1977 and to Romania and Bulgaria in 1978.
And the East German government prepared for a visit by the royal couple in September of the same year. With a view to this trip, the GDR security authorities warned of CISNU activities from the outset and took extensive precautions.
The occupation of the Iranian embassy in East Berlin by CISNU activists then again led to a political crisis. A few days later, the Iranian government recalled its diplomats from the GDR. The Iranian Chamber of Commerce and Industry demanded the termination of trade relations with East Germany.New rounds of talks were to restore normal relations. Political unrest at home and pressure from "former friends" abroad, however, deprived the Iranian government of its usual political freedom of action.
GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer travelled to Iran in April 1978 and managed to eliminate the disagreements. Due to the increasing political unrest in Iran, however, the Shah did not visit the GDR. Trade relations, however, continued. The Foreign Ministry of the German Democratic Republic believed until the end that the Shah could turn the tide in his favour. They even saw the protests as an opportunity to gain as many advantages as possible from the Shah regime.
The Iranian Revolution
In a letter to the Economics Minister of the GDR in the Federal Archives today, Foreign Minister Fischer wrote to the Economics Minister of the GDR on 29 August 1978 that the Shah was under great political pressure. He would like any indication that he was confident that he was capable of securing his power. For this reason, the Foreign Minister stated that the Shah was also interested in a long-term relationship.
Shortly thereafter, however, the Islamic revolution took place in February 1979. It marked the beginning of a new chapter in relations between Iran and the German Democratic Republic. From the outset, the Islamic Republic had adopted the foreign policy slogan: "Neither Western nor Eastern, but Islamic Republic". This led to a break in relations between the two countries.
Tehran initially did not react to East Berlin's expressions of interest in developing economic relations. But with the beginning of the Iraq-Iran war (1980 - 1988) the situation changed. The adventurous policies of the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, Iran's involvement in a devastating war and U.S. support for Iraq led Iran to turn to the countries of the Eastern bloc to buy weapons. The establishment of economic relations with the socialist states thus gained momentum.
These countries' share of Iran's foreign trade, which had been only 5 percent before the revolution, rose to 15 percent by 1983. East Germany is one of the countries that made enormous profits by selling arms to both warring parties. The GDR's export volume to Iran rose from 113.7 million East German marks in 1978 to 571 million in 1983.
Ghasem Shafie
© Iran Journal 2019
Ghasem Shafie is one of the few Iranians who has dealt with relations between Iran and the GDR. He has written two books on this subject in Persian: "The Years of Exile" and "Espionage in the Party".