The same old tale of power and exclusion

In May 2025, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) announced that it had recaptured the capital Khartoum and fully cleared it from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) after more than two years of conflict. This was considered a major victory for SAF that carried both symbolic and strategic significance. Symbolically, it was perceived to restore state sovereignty, represented by retaking the presidential palace, army headquarters, and other government institutions. Strategically, it was seen to signal a shift in the balance of power, marking the biggest turning point in the conflict to this date, where SAF gained the upper hand. 

Khartoum's recapture was a major blow to the RSF, which had seized the capital at the outset of the war precisely for its symbolic and strategic importance; losing it undermined both the RSF's political influence and military position. Nonetheless, the recapture of Khartoum was by no means the beginning of the conflict's end. In fact, the RSF has since further consolidated its grip on most of the Darfur and Kordofan regions and recently formed a parallel government. 

Since the recapture of the capital, the de facto government declared that restoring normalcy in Khartoum was its priority: it took active steps to rebuild and reestablish services, moves celebrated by many, especially those displaced from Khartoum who fully deserve to regain their city. While it is understandable, and even expected, that a government would focus on the capital first, especially when it is among the most affected by conflict, in Sudan, this focus is particularly problematic. 

Khartoum has long been privileged over the rest of the country in terms of resources and political power, despite being the smallest state by area and home to only about one-fifth of the country's population. The vast majority of Sudanese live outside the capital, in regions that have endured decades of political and economic marginalisation and conflicts. Prioritising Khartoum's recovery at the expense of other states and cities therefore risks reproducing the very inequalities that fueled Sudan's wars and perpetuating the structural disparities that have long defined the country. This tension between the rightful need to rebuild the capital and the dangers of repeating a pattern of uneven development is a major challenge that the de facto government seems oblivious to.

Restoring normalcy?

On July 12, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, leader of SAF and Sudan's de facto leader, issued a directive for the establishment of the Higher Committee for Preparing the Environment for Citizens' Return to Khartoum. The committee, headed by Sovereignty Council Member Lt. General Ibrahim Jaber, was given an expansive mandate, including reestablishing security, restoring services, rehabilitating infrastructure and relocating government institutions. 

The task is daunting, to say the least. As one of the main battlefields, Khartoum was left almost unrecognisable. Images circulating after the recapture of Khartoum show harrowing destruction to infrastructure, schools, and hospitals. All of Khartoum's electricity stations, and 12 out of its 13 water treatment stations have been destroyed. Tens of thousands of unexploded bombs still litter the capital, threatening to kill more people. The UN estimates that $350 million is needed for the rehabilitation of the capital's basic facilities and several billion dollars for its full rebuilding. 

Despite the grim situation, Prime Minister Kamil Idris declared that Khartoum would be "fully rehabilitated within six to nine months." Soon after taking office, he ordered all ministries and government institutions to return to the capital, as well as the reopening of all universities and police stations in Khartoum and the repairing of all bridges within three months. The Higher Committee pledged to restore electricity to water stations and hospitals by August and the Central Bank promised the foreign currency required, an ambitious timeline that was not met.

Meanwhile, both Idris and al-Burhan have been urging citizens to return to Khartoum, insisting that life is back to normal and that people should help with the rebuilding efforts. Indeed, more than 1.3 million Sudanese people have already returned. Among them, civil servants who were coerced to return by ultimatums to either resume work from Khartoum or face dismissal; and on August 26, Idris's recently formed cabinet held its first meeting in the capital. 

The government's fixation on Khartoum

In a recent interview on September 12, Prime Minister Idris discussed rebuilding, and focused entirely on Khartoum. When asked why he prioritizes the return to Khartoum over achieving peace, he said: "Khartoum embodies the dignity of this state; it is the national capital and a symbol of the nation. Returning to Khartoum, restoring its symbolism, and reestablishing its importance as a capital are non-negotiable … We are working around the clock to restore services: electricity, water, sewage networks, and the safety and livelihoods of citizens are all priorities." He added that, despite the recent RSF drone attack on Khartoum, the government is determined to return to the capital, insisting that the city's international airport would be fully operational within days.

Yet, when asked about what some have described as a "catastrophic situation" in other SAF-controlled states, Idris admitted that the government's presence there was partial and largely blamed the international community for its shortcomings in addressing the humanitarian crisis. This contrast highlights the government's disproportionate commitment to Khartoum, where it assumes full responsibility for reconstruction, while distancing itself from the rest of the country.

The determination to rebuild the capital and project a sense of normalcy is undeniable and far stronger than in other states. Occasionally, the government pledges to rebuild outside Khartoum: the Minister of Urban Development, Roads, and Bridges recently visited Sinnar State and promised road and infrastructure rehabilitation, while Idris visited Al-Gezira Scheme and pledged full support for its revival. However, these announcements and commitments are limited and are often overshadowed by the flood of news related to Khartoum's reconstruction. Ironically, state governors were recently invited to the capital where they reaffirmed their support for the Higher Committee and the rebuilding of Khartoum, despite their own states struggling with recovery and receiving comparatively little attention themselves. 

Beyond official statements and directives, things are actually shifting on the ground. Gradually, markets are reopening, transportation lines are getting reconnected, and economic activity is resuming. Last month alone, the head of the Higher Committee inaugurated the reopening of an oil factory, flour mills, and AlKadaro Meat Processing Complex, the latter rehabilitated by the Defense Industries System, a SAF-owned conglomerate currently under US and EU sanctions. The government started the reconstruction of hospitals, and the first phase of reconstruction of the Soba Hospital, one of largest in Khartoum, was completed. It also launched a campaign to clear and destroy 50,000 unexploded ordinance in Khartoum.

Reshaping the capital

A closer look at the mandate and actions of the Higher Committee suggests that the government's priority is not only to rebuild Khartoum as it was, but to effectively reshape it into a heavily securitised and patriarchal city. Three points of the mandate are particularly revealing of the government’s vision: the "removal of all informal housing in Khartoum State without exception"; the "regulation of foreign presence through the deportation of violating foreigners and the relocation of legal residents outside Khartoum State"; and "taking all necessary security measures to stabilize security, eliminate all negative phenomena within the capital and enforce the authority of the law and the state".

Since Khartoum's recapture, large-scale campaigns have focused on informal housing, where poor, migrant, and internally displaced communities live. In one Omdurman neighbourhood alone, 806 houses were destroyed, often without warning. The head of the Higher Committee Lt. General Jaber claimed that informal housing areas were the epicenter from which the RSF rebellion arose, and that these areas are a hub of criminal activity that served to finance the war—a narrative echoed by the director of the Land Protection Agency, as he listed all the areas that have been demolished. The official claims criminalising informal housing residents have become weaponised with reports indicating that even neighbourhoods merely perceived to be sympathetic to the RSF face demolition, regardless of whether they are informal or not. The result has been a dangerous rise in public hostility toward residents of informal housing, often with racist undertones as many are perceived to belong to certain ethnic groups.

Similarly, campaigns have targeted refugees and migrants from Ethiopia, Eriteria and South Sudan, whom the government have labeled "a cancer", accusing them of engaging in illegal activities and collaborating with the RSF. In May, the first phase of the Higher Committee's deportation and relocation plan moved refugees to camps in White Nile, Gedaref, and Kassala states. By July, an estimated 1,087 refugees had been relocated outside Khartoum, while 3,000 South Sudanese and 502 Ethiopians had been deported, many without prior warning or proper review of their legal status, even though some held residency documents or UNHCR-issued refugee cards. Some reported arbitrary arrests and fines of up to SDG 609,000 ($170), or imprisonment for up to six months if they were unable to pay. This rhetoric and policy reflect blatant xenophobia, framing migrants and refugees as security threats rather than communities integral to Khartoum and in need of protection. 

The mandate of the so-called elimination of "negative phenomena" has been routinely used against informal workers and street vendors. Recent campaigns have specifically cracked down on food and beverage sellers, following an earlier ban on selling tea in public areas, a profession long dominated by women. The government acknowledged the far-reaching impact of this decision on women's livelihoods and promised to address it by allocating designated sites and markets in Khartoum for women, an approach that is problematic on many levels. It not only undermines a key source of income for women but also seeks to remove them from public spaces, controlling where and how they can work. By confining women to specific areas, the government's proposed policy reinforces restrictions on women's mobility and visibility, effectively marginalising women from the informal economy and public life.

While reminiscent of Omar al-Bashir's regime, these campaigns differ in systemically framing marginalised communities as supporters of the RSF, which leaves them increasingly vulnerable to criminalisation, discrimination and exclusion from public and economic life. 

No lessons learned

Rebuilding Khartoum into what, for whom and at whose expense? This is the central question that must guide how we assess the de facto government's policies and actions toward the capital. 

Rather than using this moment to address Sudan's historically unequal development model, the de facto government is, like its predecessors, concentrating its efforts and resources in the centre, and even within it, on select neighborhoods, communities, and SAF allies. This shows little sign of learning from the past. Previous conflicts in Sudan, including those in southern and western Sudan, were fueled by long-standing socioeconomic grievances over uneven distribution of resources. RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo himself sought to exploit this narrative by claiming that the current war was an effort to dismantle the "state of 1956", a reference to the post-independence order in which elites from the centre accumulated power and wealth at the expense of the periphery. Unfortunately, the government's fixation on Khartoum suggests that this pattern is not only continuing but is deepening in new and more exclusionary forms.

In a heartbreaking video, an elderly woman from besieged El Fasher, SAF's last major foothold in Darfur and currently experiencing a full-blown famine, revealed she had lost six sons and asked General al-Burhan in a shaky voice: "Why are you now building Khartoum and not saving the people of El-Fashir? Instead of building Khartoum, why don't you first save the people of El-Fashir?" This is an appeal that carries within it grievances of past injustices and present neglect. 

*The RSF stormed El Fasher in late October, seizing control amid reports of widespread abuses and atrocities.

This article was originally published by The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy.

*This paragraph was added by the editor on 10 November 2025.