A future built on citizenship and freedom

Syrian society has suffered for years. The resilience and stamina of the Syrian people is remarkable—no less than that of neighbouring Levantine societies in Palestine and Lebanon.  

Under extremely challenging conditions, Syrians continue to live their everyday lives, even with hardly any opportunities to earn a livelihood. Until the fall of Bashar al-Assad on 8 December 2024, the economic situation in Syria deteriorated due, in equal measure, to sanctions, state despotism, conflict and the influence of its ruling elite. 

Syrians continue to draw strength for their hope, perseverance and resilience from two fundamental promises: citizenship and freedom. Citizenship refers to the absolute equality of all members of society, encompassing both rights and responsibilities, irrespective of majority or minority status or the relationship between different "components” of Syrian society. 

But what does "majority" truly mean? Can the presumed will of the majority be permanently enshrined in a constitution, a constitutional declaration, or a future roadmap? And is this will even cohesive? Across diverse cultural and intellectual traditions—urban or regional, ancient or modern—does it not take on substantially different interpretations?

(In contrast to the Arab national movements, ed.) The Zionist movement has been working since the first partition of Palestine by the UN in 1947 to recruit settlers to gradually establish a Jewish majority in the occupied territories while expelling the indigenous Palestinian population. Some of those expelled may have had Jewish ancestry, and later Christian, before most embraced Islam. 

The aim of this expulsion was to impose a Jewish character on the state, giving them a so-called "majority" status, and relegating non-Jews to the status of second-class citizens under an apartheid system of racial discrimination. 

In contrast, all liberation movements in the Arab Mashreq (such as in Egypt in 1919 and Syria from 1932) were based on the slogan of "religion is for God and homeland for all." According to this principle, the nation is to be shared by all its citizens, irrespective of their religious beliefs or sectarian affiliations. The older generations may still remember how, during the era of liberation, leaders would consistently address society with the words: "Dear citizens, fellow countrymen and women."

This understanding of citizenship represented a deliberate rejection of both the interference of Western colonialism—which had weakened the Ottoman state under the guise of protecting minorities—and the religiously defined Zionist project. 

It embodied a national goal that was far from easy to achieve, particularly in nations like Syria, which have been more radically shaped by religious, sectarian, ethnic and regional diversity than many countries in Europe or elsewhere. 

But for a country like ours, there is no future without this principle: "Religion for god and homeland for all."

The goals of the uprising must not be lost from sight

All Syrians celebrated the fall of Assad's dictatorship and drew hope from the promise of a transitional phase based on inclusivity—one that would end their economic suffering, promote recovery and ensure a bright future in a reunified state with full sovereignty over all its territories.  

But this promise should more clearly and emphatically include the protection of universal and individual freedoms. "Freedom forever" was the rallying cry of protesters at demonstrations in the early days of the uprising (in 2011). It is precisely for this demand that so many have sacrificed everything through death or imprisonment.  

Clarity on the question of freedom is essential, especially given that the new transitional government is currently restricting the work of some civil society organisations by, for example, revoking work permits and forcing them to apply for new ones. 

This includes organisations that have existed since the late 19th century and helped people endure the hardships of the Assad regime. In recent years, many of these organisations were active in regions under the control of the dictatorship and have therefore not received any foreign aid. 

These organisations are the backbone of Syrian society, fostering solidarity through intersecting crises. They remain indispensable today, as it will undoubtedly take time for economic and living conditions to improve. 

Additionally, the new government has placed restrictions on professional organisations, such as Syria's Bar Association, among others. New leaders of these organisations have been appointed, often from different regions. The freedom of these unions and professional organisations must be protected, and the enduring effects of long-standing authoritarian control over them must be dismantled to establish an intact state. 

All political parties and associations—including the Baath Party—have been dissolved, as announced by the transitional government on 29 January 2025, along with all "revolutionary political and civil bodies" that emerged since 2011 from the uprising against Assad. 

However, this dissolution has not been accompanied by a clear framework outlining political freedoms for the forthcoming phase, nor has any mechanism been put in place for forming and licensing new political parties or civil society organisations. The announced "National Dialogue", which will form the foundations of a new constitution, also requires further explanation.

The situation for internal Syrian political organisations stands in stark contrast to that of political parties and civil organisations that were established abroad and receive financial and moral support from external actors. These entities are poised to remain dominant political forces. Foreign influence maintains a decisive role as Syria seeks to lift sanctions and normalise relations with the international community.  

Political parties founded in Syria, or those currently attempting to establish themselves, are being undermined by these decisions and restrictions. In practice, this marks a shift in Syria's political landscape, concentrating power in external hands. 

This also carries the risk of internal conflict, something made apparent by the resurfacing, through some foreign-funded organisations, of an emphasis on "protecting minorities" at the expense of protecting freedom. 

Similarly, restrictive practices are also emerging in the realm of economic freedom, which was one of the key objectives initially identified by the new authorities. All companies are now required to re-register under the pretext that some companies were fronts for the fraudulent former regime. This mandate is being enforced even on businesses that have existed since the 1940s (long before Hafez al-Assad came to power). 

Freedom must be the focus

An issue that has so far been neglected in post-Assad Syria, is the establishment of a transitional justice system and a mechanism for social reconciliation. In delaying this process, there is a danger that the sense of joy that followed the swift and relatively bloodless fall of the dictatorship will fade, leading to attacks and reprisals. 

The joy of Syrians at the fall of the authoritarian rule was fueled by dreams of personal and universal freedom. They can still recall how Bashar al-Assad initially granted new freedoms after his rise to power in 2000, which became known as the "Damascus Spring."

The subsequent suppression of these freedoms was a key reason that Syrians rejected Assad's credo of "economic reforms before political reforms." This rejection was so strong because for Syria's population, the promised economic improvements never materialised. Instead, a system of "crony capitalism" emerged, a major catalyst for the 2011 Syrian uprising. 

Syrians are well aware that the country's path to recovery will be fraught with challenges, both internal and external. They understand that true democracy cannot be achieved overnight. 

Nevertheless, they hope that this recovery will be fundamentally grounded in universal and social freedoms and equal citizenship—essential foundations that will underpin Syria’s reconstruction and future development. Citizenship and ciil liberties are fundamental to the dignity of syrian society, as essential as livelihoods, work and everyday living conditions. 

This is an edited translation of the Arabic original. Translated by Amany Alsiefy.