Civil society in survival mode

In October 2024, President Kais Saied was re-elected in a tightly controlled political environment, following a campaign in which opposition candidates were silenced and independent electoral oversight was effectively blocked. 

At the time, the Bertelsmann Stiftung published an article in which two possible scenarios for the future of Tunisia-EU relations were sketched: one of deepening authoritarianism and isolation, and another of continued authoritarian rule accompanied by selective improvements in governance and economic cooperation. Now, almost a year later, where do things stand? 

One point in the initial analysis needs correction: the sudden increase of 700,000 registered voters before the election—widely discussed but unexplained by the Tunisian election commission—resulted from a legal change introducing automatic registration for 18-year-olds. This matters because it distorts turnout figures, which appeared historically low. In fact, Saied largely maintained a stable support base, especially beyond the urban elite—a fact often overlooked in academic analyses. 

The authoritarian path

Even in the run-up to the elections, it was already apparent that Saied's new term would mean a further erosion of the rule of law and the separation of powers. 

In April 2022, President Saied restructured the electoral commission, the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE), appointing all seven members himself. Ahead of the election, ISIE unlawfully excluded 14 candidates from the race. The move was overturned by the administrative court—the highest in Tunisia and the only body legally authorised to rule on candidacy disputes— but ISIE openly ignored the ruling, effectively clearing the way for Saied's re-election. 

Just days before the vote, one of Saied's two remaining competitors, Ayachi Zammel, was also imprisoned. This collapse of checks and balances is reflected in the 2024 Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI 2024), where Tunisia scores just 4 out of 10 for "Free and Fair Elections". In the BTI 2026 (which will be published in early 2026), this indicator drops even further to a mere 2 out of 10, underscoring the accelerating decline of electoral integrity and democratic oversight. 

Shrinking civic space

Civil society and media have come under severe pressure, and key opposition figures and activists are either in prison or silenced. Among them are popular figures like renowned human rights activist Sihem Bensredine and lawyer and public figure Sonia Dahmani, who was arrested, and whose family members were later convicted for publicly calling for her release.  

Political discussion in public spaces has become rare; cultural events are frequently attended by plainclothes officers, and a climate of fear has set in, with people whispering about sensitive topics. At the heart of this repression is Decree-Law 54, especially its controversial Article 24. This provision criminalises the dissemination of so-called "false information" online if it is assumed to cause harm—without requiring proof of damage. 

Although the General Legislation Committee of the ARP began reviewing this law in July 2025, its constitutionality remains in serious doubt. The article stands in clear violation of fundamental constitutional principles, as it penalises presumed intent and grants prosecutors broad discretionary powers. 

Reflecting this downward trend, the BTI 2026 registers a further decline in both freedom of expression and association and assembly rights, with each indicator dropping to just 4 out of 10—down from 5 in the 2024 edition. This erosion is further corroborated by declines in other international press freedom rankings.

Silencing dissent, targetting the marginalised

A similar pattern of legal overreach and executive interference is evident in the so-called "coup d'état affair" (Affaire du complot contre l’État), which has become emblematic of the autocratic power consolidation. Since early 2023, the government has launched a wave of arrests targeting opposition politicians, lawyers, journalists, and business figures accused—often without clear evidence—of "plotting against state security". Trials have been repeatedly delayed or held under the exclusion of a public audience or even the accused themselves. 

Charges remain vague, leading observers to describe the case as politically motivated. While the BTI 2026 does not yet show a further decline in the indicators for Separation of Powers (score: 3) and Independent Judiciary (score: 4), developments surrounding the "coup d'état affair" and other lesser-known cases—where judges increasingly avoid politically sensitive rulings for fear of dismissal and detainees remain in pre-trial detention for years—suggest that a downgrade may be warranted. By contrast, Tunisia's civil rights score dropped sharply from 6 to 3, reflecting the erosion of protections for personal liberty, legal equality, and access to justice, both de jure and de facto. 

Beyond political dissent, this deterioration of civil rights extends to the systematic targeting of marginalised communities: Tunisian authorities have intensified hate speech and crackdowns targeting especially sub-Saharan African migrants. Rhetoric about demographic "replacement" has escalated into violent actions, including the burning of migrant camps in Sfax by security forces in April 2025. International organisations have largely avoided addressing the issue out of fear or futility, but Tunisia is no longer a safe country for sub-Saharan migrants.

A society in survival mode

Meanwhile, Tunisia's economic conditions have further deteriorated. Daily life is marked by rapidly shifting prices for imported goods, rising living costs and unreliable access to basic necessities. The state's administrative machinery is barely functioning in many areas, due to Saied's ongoing purges. 

Dozens of ministers, directors-general and governors have been dismissed, often overnight, without explanation. One vivid example of this volatility is the governorate of Ben Arous, which saw three governors appointed within 48 hours—one of whom never officially took office. The prime minister, Kamel Madouri, was dismissed in March 2025 after less than a year in office and replaced overnight by the minister of infrastructure. Under Saied, key government positions have become short-lived, with erratic communication and opaque decision-making replacing institutional continuity.  

For many Tunisians, daily life is now shaped by individual survival. Tunisians rely heavily on remittances from relatives abroad—representing 6% of Tunisia's GDP in 2023. Trust in public institutions is low, and private alternatives are increasingly sought out for healthcare, education and other essential services.  

Mass protests have remained rare, but there have been flare-ups of collective anger—most notably in April 2025, when a school building collapsed in the governorate of Sidi Bouzid, killing three students. The tragedy sparked violent protests and a general strike in a region long plagued by neglect and mismanagement. It was a symbolic echo of Tunisia's 2011 revolution, which began in the same region. Although this moment of rage did not cascade into wider upheaval, it revealed the unresolved tensions and potential flashpoints within Tunisia's interior. 

A moment for the EU to recalibrate

The EU's focus has drifted to other crises—from Syria to Gaza—while funding cuts, particularly after the re-election of Donald Trump in the United States, have weakened support for local development initiatives. Many Tunisians lost jobs tied to donor-funded projects. 

As authoritarianism deepens and Tunisia becomes more inward-looking, civil society must not be abandoned. A renewed and credible EU engagement—built on trust, responsiveness, and long-term cooperation—is needed now more than ever.  

Over the past two years, EU-level support for the Tunisian government—driven largely by Italy—has primarily aimed at curbing irregular migration, inadvertently reinforcing Saied's populist and inflammatory narrative. When change comes, it is likely to emerge not from elite circles, but from the heart of Tunisia—from its neglected regions, frustrated youth and resilient communities. 

This requires an honest commitment and, above all, dialogue on equal footing. EU member states are currently viewed with particular scepticism due to their ambiguous and fragmented stance toward Israel. This undermines their credibility and affects their engagement on the ground. If they wish to support Tunisia's democratic forces, they must rebuild credibility and support those forces in Tunisia capable of bringing about genuine change. 

Article courtesy of the Bertelsmann Stiftung's BTI Blog.