Europe must support the agents of change

14 years since the Arab Spring, the much-anticipated widespread democratic transition in West Asia and North Africa (WANA) remains elusive. Despite regime changes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen in 2011, and more recently in Algeria, Sudan and Syria, authoritarian rule persists across the region.  

Throughout this period, civil society organisations (CSOs), such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community organisations and protest movements, have faced escalating surveillance and persecution, severely hindering their pivotal work. 

In Egypt under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, independent civil society organisations have been targeted by legislation like the 2019 NGO Law, officially restricting their work to “societal development” and effectively banning work on political issues like inequality, human rights or environmental pollution. 

Defamation, unjust prosecution and unlawful detention of CSO staff have become commonplace. In 2022, one of the country’s leading CSOs, the Arab Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI), was forced to close after 18 years because repression had made it impossible for them to operate. 

Egypt exemplifies a broad regional trend. The region has maintained its status as the world’s most authoritarian according to global democracy indices. It faces the world’s highest levels of CSO repression, and its governments rank lowest in CSO participation, reflecting the extent to which CSOs influence policymaking. 

Even in the region’s few flawed democracies, like Iraq, Lebanon and Israel, CSOs face shrinking space due to attacks from law enforcement, religious actors, rising populism and authoritarian legislation. 

Since the 2011 uprisings, counter-revolutionary forces have further entrenched authoritarianism. Donor countries need to double their efforts to support independent CSOs working in repressive contexts and to help them survive attacks by the authorities.

Authoritarian regimes are unfit partners for stability

European governments must recognise that WANA’s incumbent regime elites are largely unwilling to implement reforms that would reduce their control over political institutions, policymaking or the distribution of resources. As a result, Europe’s government-centred policies are upholding the autocratic status quo.  

Instead of empowering groups who can hold regimes to account, European policies have predominantly focused on bolstering executive institutions to enhance their capacity to provide public services and control their borders. This approach is often justified by citing development goals, or the fight against terrorism and irregular migration. 

These policies sustain corrupt state apparatuses by granting autocratic regimes access to resources. Meanwhile, providing equipment and training to authoritarian security services facilitates repression and fuels the very migration these policies seek to prevent.

Europe’s partnership with Tunisia highlights the unintended consequences of European foreign and development policy. The populist and xenophobic rhetoric of Tunisian President Kais Saied, paired with the actions of Tunisian security forces trained and equipped by Europe, has fuelled violence against Black Tunisians and African migrants, resulting in the deportation of hundreds of migrants to the Libyan border, where they endure inhumane conditions.

Similarly in Egypt, the repression under Sisi’s military rule has caused a surge in the number of Egyptians attempting to reach Europe via perilous sea routes, despite substantial European investment in Egyptian border control. European security cooperation through funding, equipment and training, has enabled authorities to expand their campaign against CSOs, contributing to a more repressive climate and a rise in migration from Egypt. 

In Israel, several Palestinian human rights groups have been officially designated as terrorist organisations, prohibiting their funding or public expressions of support, and enabling authorities to close their offices, seize assets and arrest staff.

New laws have eroded freedom of press at an unprecedented scale. Nevertheless, at the EU-Israel Association Council meeting in February, the EU once again reiterated its support for Israel, ignoring calls for a suspension of the association agreement due to Israeli human rights abuses and violations of international law in Gaza and beyond. 

These examples illustrate that any short-term results from such cooperation come at the high cost of entrenching authoritarianism and continuous human rights abuses. It empowers repressive security forces, undermines accountability, heightens polarisation and fuels political violence, irregular migration and instability.

Context-specific support

In order to support CSOs in the region, European policymakers need to understand the specific operating conditions of organisations at the national and regional levels. Support must always be tailored to local conditions. 

In very repressive contexts, it may only be possible to offer defensive support to CSOs, for example, in the form of protection of CSO staff through special visa and fellowship programmes.  

Some authoritarian regimes have even co-opted non-state actors including trade unions and religious organisations. These organisations can no longer be considered independent as they are forced to make deals with authoritarian regimes. In this case, local knowledge of the civil society landscape and the role of state co-optation and repression is crucial to identify change agents and avoid funding co-opted organisations.

In more permissive states, donor countries can adopt more ambitious support strategies aimed at increasing the resilience of CSOs. Donors can sometimes bypass funding restrictions, for example, by funding sister organisations and exiled human rights activists. They can empower CSOs in the region by referencing their reports and demands and providing platforms at summits or diplomatic gatherings. 

The causes of the Arab Spring uprisings are neither resolved nor improving. The underlying social and political tensions and long-term economic injustices have worsened for most citizens of the region over the past decade.  

As a result, it is not too bold to predict that the next few years will see the eruption of more mass protests and more violent crackdowns by governments in power. But there are also likely to be windows of opportunity for political and economic transformation. It is of paramount importance that policymakers support the agents of change to prepare for such openings.