A history of violence

December 1996, after 16 years in Hafez al-Assad's prisons, I was released from custody. I was 36 years old at the time. The only event in my life that has had a similar impact was the fall of the Syrian regime in December 2024. By then I was 64 years old. 

The destruction of the prisons and secret service headquarters in Damascus, and previously in Aleppo, was a clear sign that our long-oppressed country had been able to free itself from the collective imprisonment imposed by the Assads. Three weeks later, I arrived in Damascus for the first time after eleven years, two months and 18 days in exile. 

The end of Assad's rule is one of four major events in Syria's history since the beginning of the 20th century. The first was the proclamation of the Kingdom of Syria by Faisal I in 1920, when the Ottoman Empire lost its territories in the Middle East after the First World War. It was an attempt to think of Syria as a modern nation state, something historically unprecedented. 

Just a few months later, France took over the territory on the basis of a League of Nations mandate. It took 26 years until the final withdrawal of French troops on 17 April 1946, now known as Independence Day. This event was followed by a quarter of a century of political unrest. Hafez al-Assad's seizure of power in 1970 marked the beginning of a reign of terror. And now, 54 years later, the fourth turning point came: the fall of the regime. It marked the beginning of the "post-Assad era." But what do these four historical turning points mean for us?

Repression, mass arrests and massacres

The first Syrian "founding", which took place in 1920 under Faisal, was not really a founding at all. The country merely changed hands, with the French taking over from the Ottomans. The Syrians did not gain their freedom; on the contrary, the French actively worked to prevent this from happening. It was not until independence in 1946 that an attempt was finally made to address the internal conflicts and problems of our still young country and to solve them together. 

Some of these problems involved the ethnically, religiously and denominationally diverse populations, which had no established model for coexistence. Other problems had to do with the plight of the farmers. All this took place in a difficult geopolitical context marked by two factors: first, the establishment of Israel in 1948 at the expense of the Palestinian people; second, the beginning of the Cold War. 

Syria was politically unstable at the time, and there were several military coups between 1949 and 1970. The last of these brought the then Minister of Defence, Hafez al-Assad, to power after the crushing Arab defeat by Israel in the Six-Day War of 1967.

Assad ruled for thirty years. His methods included political repression, mass arrests and massacres of the civilian population. After his death in 2000, Hafez's son Bashar took over. The Assad family ruled Syria for more than half a century. This is a long time, not only because it accounts for more than half of the entire history of modern Syria, but also because of our demographics: 96 percent of the population is now under the age of sixty, and the vast majority have never consciously experienced anything other than the Assad regime.

Syria needs a vibrant political culture and constructive public debate. Instead, we have experienced 14 years of revolution, war and appalling human suffering. How can this forge a future for our country? The historical turning points already mentioned were all the result of violence: two world wars, a war in the Middle East, a revolution and, finally, a civil war.

After each of these turning points, the social conditions were hard: French occupation in the first phase, military coups in the second and, finally, the Assad family's tyranny. And even now, after the end of the dictatorship, our problems are chronic: shortly after Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow, Israel attacked Syria, destroyed military installations and began to occupy new territories, in addition to the Golan Heights it has held since 1967. Further attacks followed in July, ostensibly to protect the Druze. In addition, US, Russian and Turkish troops remain on Syrian soil, even if they are keeping a low profile. 

The revenge motive

Three months after the regime change, there was widespread conflict on the coast, the area where the majority of Syrian Alawites live, around twelve percent of the total population. Crimes were committed that, in some cases, amounted to massacres. 

Two factors come together here: First, many Syrians believe that the Alawite population in particular supported the Assad regime, which in turn had deliberately tyrannised Sunni regions during the years of revolution and war. Second, there is religiously motivated hatred fuelled by the perceived otherness of the Alawite faith, which many consider a threatening secret doctrine.

If you look for reasons for these violent outbreaks, you have to understand that Syrian Sunnis, who make up about seventy percent of the population, have a mixture of pent-up anger as well as new aspirations towards omnipotence. This anger stems from the discriminatory violence of the Assad regime, under which many Sunnis suffered. Many now believe they can take brutal revenge on their alleged tormentors without hindrance. Of course, this also means that completely innocent people are constantly being targeted.

The agreement on integrating the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the new Syrian state should also be viewed in this context. It was concluded back in March 2025, but has still not been implemented. Among other things, it involves integrating the SDF into state-affiliated civil and military institutions and recognising the Kurdish community as an important part of the Syrian state with full citizenship rights. After all, Kurds make up eight to ten percent of the total population. 

The fundamental problems that the various population groups have with each other for historical reasons are exacerbated by Syria's tough economic reality. Around 90 percent of Syrians live below the poverty line of two US dollars a day. This is the result of years of war, but also of Western and American sanctions, which have deprived the civilian population of their livelihoods rather than affecting the elites under Assad. 

The new elite is also problematic. First and foremost is Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the alliance of militias that defeated Assad's troops and whose former leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, is now the country's transitional president. It emerged from the Al-Qaeda-affiliated group Jabhat al-Nusra. Officially, it has broken away from Al-Qaeda and now presents itself as part of the Syrian revolution. After the upheaval, HTS was dissolved and its fighters were integrated into the Syrian army. 

However, it remains doubtful whether the many different factions that were involved in the overthrow of the Assad regime can be persuaded to cooperate. Some are extremist, some consist of foreign jihadists, and others are deeply corrupt and have committed a long list of crimes. Given this situation, it remains questionable whether the Ministry of Defence will really have a monopoly on weapons in the future.

In addition to all these serious and obvious problems, there is another, lesser-known issue that has received far too little attention: the ecological crisis. During my stay in Damascus, Homs, Latakia and Suwazyda in January 2025, it only rained once for a few minutes (in Damascus) during what is otherwise a cold and rainy month. During my second visit from mid-May to mid-June, the heat was extreme, comparable only to the usually hot months of July and August. 

The entire Middle East is affected by global climate change. It is foreseeable that, following the politically induced waves of refugees ten years ago, we will see an increase in climate migration. These problems are further exacerbated by the sharp population growth—from six million in 1970 to around 25 million today. There is a danger that Syria will squander its chance for a new beginning, as has so often been the case in the country's history.

The historical legacy seems too heavy to bear: the French have redrawn the borders of our country several times, thereby weakening its Arab-Islamic foundation, so to speak. The early independence movement wanted to overcome the colonial order and return to a Sunni-dominated central power like the Ottomans before them—but this time with an Arab culture and in opposition to Turkey. 

From a religious-political perspective, the anti-liberal Assad regime can be understood as a return to the logic of French colonialism. All of this has led to a deep crisis of confidence in the unity of the state. The new rulers seem to want to implement a kind of modern, post-Ottoman "millet system", i.e., relative autonomy for different population groups in matters of faith in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state. But this approach also seems hopeless and could soon fail again due to the country’s unresolved internal contradictions. 

However, the greatest danger threatening Syria today is a disease that has plagued us for decades: tyranny. Among the various political tendencies that exist in Syria today, the strongest is probably that of concentrating power in the hands of the Sunni forces that overthrew the Assad regime. 

This means a fusion of state and religion. This inevitably leads to sectarian discrimination. The various groups are played off against each other in order to secure one's own rule. This is basically how it worked during the Assad era, and the pattern now seems to be repeating itself. This combination of tyranny and sectarianism almost inevitably leads to extreme, often even genocidal violence. 

Without a decisive response to this threat, Syria will not be able to solve any of its complex problems: neither the external threat, such as Israeli attacks, nor the economic misery, nor the fallout from global warming. 

Syria's new beginning is precarious

All of this would require international cooperation. The only thing that Syrians themselves can do is to learn the right lessons from their history, especially when it comes to tyranny, sectarian division and our history of violence. Whether they succeed in doing so depends on their resilience and their willingness to resist any new autocratic powers that may emerge. 

At present, the new government is acting in a contradictory way. It wants to calm the situation, build trust and curb violent attacks. On the other hand, however, its claim to power arouses mistrust, alienates parts of the population and exacerbates social polarisation.

As early as March, at least 13,000 Alawites fled to Lebanon because they feared for their lives. The number of asylum applications in Europe is also rising. Since Assad's fall, only a few hundred thousand of the more than seven million Syrian refugees have returned. Syria's new beginning is precarious. 

Apart from the conflicts mentioned above, there are entire population groups and parts of the country that are still outside the new political order. Much depends on how three key political forces behave and interact: the new government, civil society and the organisations of the various ethnic-religious groups.

I am often asked whether I am optimistic or pessimistic. My answer is: I am interactive. Interaction seems to me less self-centred than pessimism and less naive than optimism. If you choose it as your guiding principle, you remain open without presuming to make a final judgement. I interact with what is happening in my country. 

I am happy when the situation improves, even if it is my political opponents who bring about positive change. Anything else would be selfish and irresponsible. But those in power must always be subjected to our critical gaze; we must never trust them!

This is an edited translation of the Arabic original. Translated from German by Jess Smee.

This text appears in a joint edition of Qantara and Kulturaustausch magazine. Find more stories, interviews and analyses in our Syria focus section.