An uneasy alliance

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa did not participate in the Arab Summit held in Iraq's capital Baghdad this May, after a campaign against his visit was launched by Iraqi political forces close to Iran. Shiite armed factions and parties within the ruling coalition opposed his presence—some Shiite MPs even pushed for a parliamentary resolution to bar him from attending—citing his involvement in fighting in Iraq during the 2000s as part of al-Qaeda. 

The controversy surrounding al-Sharaa's invitation underlines the ongoing tension in Iraqi-Syrian relations, which have fluctuated since he came to power. Until the fall of Bashar al-Assad, there were several points of convergence between the two countries, including close relations with Iran and cooperation in security and the economy.  

Late 2024 marked a turning point, with the rise of a new administration in Syria with a complicated past and a different approach to regional alliances. Baghdad faces a new reality: Iran is no longer a common ally between the two countries and the new elite in Damascus includes figures who previously fought alongside al-Qaeda inside Iraq.  

But the two countries also share a common threat: ISIS, which is regrouping and waiting for an opportunity to resume its activities across the two countries' borders. Iraq must decide whether the shared imperative of confronting ISIS outweighs concerns about al-Sharaa and the background of Syria's new leadership. 

Shifting relations

Iraq has responded to developments in Syria since Assad's fall in two distinct phases—initial caution followed by gradual rapprochement. The shift was driven in part by the growing international acceptance of al-Sharaa as well as the shared interests between the two countries, particularly securing their borders and combating terrorism. 

In the first phase, Baghdad's response was limited to sending an official delegation headed by the head of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, Hamid al-Shatri, to Syria on 26 December 2024. Iraq avoided further engagement with the new Syrian administration. Iraqi officials did not congratulate al-Sharaa on his assumption of the presidency last January.  

In February, Mahmoud al-Hayani, a leader in Iraq's ruling Coordination Framework, attributed Iraq's silence on al-Sharaa's presidency to "terrorist cases" against members of his government related to activities within the ranks of al-Qaeda in Iraq between 2005 and 2011. 

The second phase began in mid-March, when Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Sheibani visited Iraq. During the visit, the threat of ISIS dominated public statements, outlining the central priority in relations between the two countries. 

On 1 April, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani congratulated the Syrian president on forming the new Syrian government and expressed respect for the Syrian people's choice, emphasising once again in a phone call the importance of bilateral cooperation in confronting ISIS.  

Soon after came Baghdad's official invitation to al-Sharaa to participate in the Arab Summit, and the following controversy. Al-Sharaa declined, according to Syrian sources, to avoid embarrassing the Iraqi government. 

Iraqi researcher Ramadan al-Badran attributed the shift in tone to Baghdad easing its reservations about al-Sharaa's past, citing the new Syrian administration's relatively moderate and rational approach alongside growing Arab and international recognition of the new government.

United against a common enemy

"ISIS is also one of the most important and sensitive issues for Iraq and Syria, and a key factor in bringing the two countries closer together under the new Syrian regime," al-Badran told Qantara. 

In the months following the fall of Assad, ISIS moved quickly to exploit the transitional period, reorganising and recruiting new fighters. During a recent visit to Baghdad, David Des Roches, a military affairs expert and professor at the National Defense University in Washington, reported sensing concern among Iraqi officials, who expressed fears about ISIS re-establishing itself in Syria. 

In April, The New York Times reported that senior US intelligence officials warned, in their annual global threat assessment, that ISIS would attempt to exploit the fall of the Assad regime to free prisoners and regain its ability to plan and carry out attacks. 

The key threat now lies in ISIS finding a way to free thousands of prisoners, many of them experienced fighters, who have been held in prisons controlled by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) since ISIS's defeat in 2019. The head of the Iraqi National Security Service, Abdul Karim Abdul Fadhil, said in April that ISIS was planning to attack the al-Hol prison camp in northeastern Syria to release of thousands of detained fighters. 

He also highlighted that the SDF are denying ISIS any room to maneuver, preventing the group from regaining its strength on its territory. Following the agreement between al-Sharaa and the SDF to integrate the Kurdish-led forces into the army and public institutions, Damascus and Baghdad can benefit from the SDF's extensive experience in combating ISIS to prevent the group's revival.

This tripartite cooperation between Damascus, Baghdad and the SDF is vital to restrict ISIS's free movement across the border and thwart attempts to free prisoners. The SDF possess extensive experience combating ISIS, gained in Syria between 2014 and 2019, and can play this role again in the future, according to Kurdish political analyst Suleiman Jaafar. "The SDF will not hesitate to participate in any future cooperation against ISIS if Iraq requests it," he told Qantara. 

A long-term solution?

The resurgence of ISIS has created "opportunity for rapprochement and coordination," says Syrian journalist Firas Younes. "The current Syrian regime is determined to fight ISIS, as there are roots of hostility between them, dating back to when Hayat Tahrir al-Sham—the al-Sharaa led faction that overthrew Assad—operated as al-Nusra under al-Qaeda."

Younes continued, "There is a need for the two countries to coordinate security and military issues, and the experience of Kurdish forces confronting ISIS is very important in this regard." 

Security coordination will be central, but Younes stresses that military efforts alone are not enough. Lasting stability, he says, depends on political reform: "the creation of an inclusive democratic system in Syria, the promotion of freedoms and the beginning of rapid reconstruction."

The fight against ISIS has been a major catalyst for rapprochement between Syria and Iraq. However, neutralising ISIS's cross-border threat in the long term will require consolidating democratic mechanisms within Syria, broadening political representation, and Al-Sharaa's continued ability to leverage Kurdish expertise.