"We are in a legal vacuum"

A group of people sit on a train platform surrounded by luggage.
Sudanese families returning to Sudan from Cairo, July 2025. (Photo: picture alliance / Matrix Images | K. Elfiqi)

Egypt hosts more than one million registered refugees, most from Sudan. Recent legislation has stripped away protections, creating chaos in the country's asylum system and violating international law, says Nour Khalil, director of Refugees Platform Egypt (RPE).

Interview by Clara Taxis

Qantara: In your recent report, "The Collapse of Egypt's Protection for Refugees", you discuss Law No. 164 of 2024, introduced in December. What is this law? How has it transformed Egypt's asylum system? 

Nour Khalil: ​​​Until December 2024, Egypt had no domestic asylum law. The refugee protection system was based on the Constitution, international law and the Memorandum of Understanding between the UNHCR and the Egyptian Government.  

Under this system, responsibility for protection was shared: UNHCR reviewed cases and determined protection status; then, the Egyptian ministries issued residence permits. UNHCR's partners, in cooperation with the Egyptian state, provided for the basic needs of refugees. 

Ein Mann mit Brille und Anzug sitzt vor einem Mikrofon. Hinter ihm der Schriftzug des EU-Parlaments.
Human Rights Lawyer

Nour Khalil is a human rights lawyer and Executive Director of the Refugees Platform in Egypt. He is based in Italy. He holds a degree in law and Islamic jurisprudence from Al Azhar University.

The new law, however, changes the system profoundly. It introduces a domestic asylum system that centralises asylum management under government control and offers limited rights under strict conditions. 

Our main criticism is that Law No. 164 violates international and domestic law: the text provides no transparent procedures, no independent overview of the committee deciding on people's status and no protection from deportation while decisions are appealed. We have already seen that this leads to unchecked deportations, violating the principle of non-refoulement. Instead of protection, the law focuses on the criminalisation of irregular entry and of nationals who support refugees in any way.  

The law has been in place for almost a year now, but how the transition from the old to the new system will be handled is still unclear. Why? 

Here we are at the source of the chaos we are currently witnessing: the law itself did not stipulate a transitional phase and left many things open to executive directives, which the prime minister was supposed to issue within six months. So far, the Egyptian government has not even initiated discussions or consultations with refugee stakeholders, civil society representatives or international organisations. 

We are in a legal vacuum. No committee exists to take over from UNHCR. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Interior is deliberately delaying the issuance of residency permits based on documents issued by UNHCR.  

With UNHCR documents no longer recognised by Egyptian authorities, how are the over one million registered refugees supposed to navigate the situation?  

It is a time of intense insecurity.  Every registered refugee must renew their residency regularly, but the Ministry of Interior is delaying appointments for up to two years, avoiding the issuance of residence permits while waiting for the new system to be implemented. 

There are real concerns that refugees and asylum seekers currently registered with the UNHCR will have to re-register with the proposed new committee. We do not know what their fate will be. New arrivals who are not yet registered with UNHCR face waiting periods of up to 12 months for an appointment, further delaying the process. 

During this period without a permit, refugees are under the scrutiny of Egyptian law enforcement agencies. They are denied access to all services, including telecommunications, justice, housing, emergency services, health and education. They are exposed to the risk of detention and forced deportation under the pretext of illegal presence. 

The EU is in close contact with Egypt regarding its management of migration. In 2024, the European Parliament agreed on a €7.4 billion aid package for Egypt. What has been the EU's reaction to the latest developments?  

The EU has helped the Egyptian authorities draft what it calls "national asylum legislation". According to the EU's logic, this domestic asylum system is a central element of its long-term ambition: declaring Egypt a safe country of origin and residency.  

In the past, we have seen human rights abuses ignored or sidelined so that the EU can claim Egypt is a safe and reliable "partner" for managing migration. We therefore do not expect any impactful criticism of the new law from the EU. 

In the report, you mention the case of a 95-year-old Sudanese woman who was arrested after crossing into Egypt irregularly. She died shortly after in a prisoner transport vehicle. She was wounded and fragile. Why did she not receive better treatment? 

This case proves that the Egyptian military perceives irregular crossings as a security threat, even if it involves vulnerable people. In her case, she was already injured by an accident that took place while she was in the smuggler's vehicle in the desert. The journey takes up to twelve hours, and refugees usually do not have access to sun protection, fresh water or food. 

Still, in the eyes of the Egyptian state, she committed a crime by crossing the border and was therefore detained. The July heat and suffocation in a poorly ventilated prison transporter for many hours caused her death. 

In addition, we have to remember that many people disappear in the desert, either because of deadly accidents or because they end up in military camps. There are no search-and-rescue missions in the desert along the Egyptian-Sudanese border. 

If she had been luckier—if she had not been wounded and had avoided arrest near Aswan—what would her chances have been of obtaining refugee status in Egypt? 

Very low. Egyptian authorities are not only arresting those newly arrived in the desert or the first city on the way, Aswan. They also conduct checks along the bus and train routes to Cairo—only in Cairo can people apply for protection. UNHCR has not been allowed to set up registration centres closer to the border or to monitor the situation there.  

Even if she had made it to Cairo, the above-mentioned legal limbo would have denied her a status or other legal papers. The risk of arrest and deportation back to Sudan would have been high. In 2024, we documented over 20,000 cases of deportations to Sudan—including individuals with UNHCR papers.  

Many Sudanese try to cross into Libya, as they basically have no chance of residing legally in Egypt long-term. According to Libyan authorities, Libya received 20,000-25,000 Sudanese from Egypt between April 2023 and January 2025. 

Deportations to Sudan cannot be realised without the Sudanese state's agreement. What role does the Sudanese embassy play?  

Without the embassy’s agreement, Egypt could not deport anyone to Sudan. These deportations involve numerous violations of international law: families are separated, legal documents are torn apart or ignored. The embassy has even facilitated deportations of non-Sudanese to Sudan, for example, Eritreans. 

​​​​​Does the situation also affect other communities of refugees, like Syrians or Palestinians? 

The most affected communities are Sudanese, due to sheer numbers. However, arrests also target Syrian and Eritrean refugees, as well as migrant workers of various nationalities.  

Palestinians face multiple crises. Companies linked to the Egyptian authorities profited in 2024 by forcing Palestinians entering Egypt through the Rafah crossing to pay sums exceeding $5,000. Meanwhile, the Egyptian authorities do not issue residency permits to those evacuated, depriving them of access to services.  

As violations increase and policies have become more extreme, hate speech, incitement, and misinformation about refugees and asylum seekers have proliferated on social media and in the speeches of Egyptian officials. 

The situation you are describing is very violent. How do you gather your empirical information? 

We work with different sources. We have a wide range of reports and documents, some publicly available. ​​Other information is leaked to us from within the Egyptian administration, and we verify internal files of various law enforcement agencies. 

Collecting information on the ground is risky because the publication of “false” information—or any information about areas controlled by the military—is highly criminalised. We cannot collect information in detention centres either. Not even UNHCR have access to those facilities.  

We rely on people on the move themselves. They are the bravest witnesses. Providing legal support is extremely challenging due to the collapse of the system, but we can document their journeys and collect their testimonies. 

© Qantara.de