India’s arm sales to Israel are a political statement

Supporters of India's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) at a rally in solidarity with Israel in New Delhi on 15 October 2023
Supporters of the Indian Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) at a solidarity rally with Israel in New Delhi on 15 October 2023, photo: picture alliance / ZUMAPRESS.com | Pradeep Gaur

The ammunition supplies to Israel may bring more support for India within Western capitals. However, the Arab-Israeli crisis continues to shape the future balance of power in the Middle East, mainly against the Western countries and their Gulf allies, states the Indian Middle-East expert Omair Anas.

By Omair Anas

India’s diplomacy in the Middle East is again under pressure from conflicting parties of the Arab-Israeli crisis. India’s traditional policy of favoring a two-state solution with East Jerusalem as the capital of an independent and viable Palestinian state remains unchanged. Nevertheless, much has changed about how India reinterprets the meaning and the context of its Palestine policy.

“The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s pro-Israeli gestures are no secret to Arab diplomats. They knew that a BJP-led government in New Delhi would start a new chapter of relations with Israel.”

After the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, Indian media and right-wing public opinion had overwhelmingly supported the Israeli military response in Gaza. Arab diplomats based in New Delhi expressed their unease over the increasingly hostile public opinion toward Palestine.

Beyond the Balancing Act

The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s pro-Israeli gestures are no secret to Arab diplomats. They knew that a BJP-led government in New Delhi would start a new chapter of relations with Israel beyond the traditional “balancing act.”

“Those who are aware of Israel’s efforts to normalize ties with Pakistan understand that two Muslim nations, Pakistan and Indonesia, remain of great importance for Israel and its Western backers, who facilitated the Abraham Accords.”

The BJP and its ecosystem of support see Israel as a country that always stood with India in times of crises with Pakistan. Israel, aware of India-Pakistan disputes, fully used this as an opportunity and kept its normalization efforts with Pakistan secret to avoid India’s sensitive public opinion. Those who are aware of Israel’s efforts to normalize ties with Pakistan understand that two Muslim nations, Pakistan and Indonesia, remain of great importance for Israel and its Western backers, who facilitated the Abraham AccordsSaudi Arabia, too, supports Pakistan-Israeli relations, as Pakistan remains its key traditional ally.

In this context, the India-Israeli ties may not stay exclusive and may not be specifically Pakistan-centric in the long term. Israel, along with Pakistan and Turkey, was a key supporter of Azerbaijan’s recapture of Nagorno Karabakh in 2020, while Armenia relied on Indian military supplies.

Since the Gaza-Israel conflict started, India has faced a different challenge.

First, there is a strong pro-Israeli public opinion that is ingrained in the ideology of the ruling party and its supporters in India. Second, under Narendra Modi’s decade-long rule, India has decided to end the previous reluctance and isolation from regional affairs, reprioritizing its relations with Gulf countries.

“In an ongoing competition for influence in the Gulf between the United States and China, India has joined the West-led efforts to support the Gulf countries’ security and stability. This is a bid to check the growing Chinese influence in the region.”

How China fits in

In an ongoing competition for influence in the Gulf between the United States and China, India has joined the West-led efforts to support the Gulf countries’ security and stability. This is a bid to check the growing Chinese influence in the region. India is ready to offer strategic and security support to the region via newly upgraded relations. The China-brokered Iran-Saudi normalization has also helped India.

Cargo ship in the harbour of Chabahar, Iran
Cargo ship at Chabahar port, Iran, February 2019, photo: picture alliance / AA | Fatemeh Bahrami

For India, Iran’s real strategic value is not in the Gulf but in Central Asia and South Asia, where Iran supports India’s efforts in multiple connectivity projects. In this sense, India’s advancing relations with Israel have received little or muted objection from Iran.

“India has previously welcomed the Abraham Accords, a Donald Trump-era initiative to re-engineer the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict outside the U.N. resolutions. Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Qatar, and Iran have refused to jump on the bandwagon of the so-called new peace process.”

When news broke about India supplying arms and ammunition to Israel amid military conflict, neither Arab states nor Iran reacted. The supply of ammunition, yet to be confirmed officially, is a significant statement on India’s recalibration of Middle East relations.

All official statements of India’s Ministry of External Affairs have underlined that Hamas’ actions on October 7, 2023, were acts of “terrorism,” a position taken by most of Western governments and silently supported by their Gulf allies, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

India has previously welcomed the Abraham Accords, a Donald Trump-era initiative to re-engineer the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict outside the U.N. resolutions. Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Qatar, and Iran have refused to jump on the bandwagon of the so-called new peace process.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (left) and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas after signing a cooperation agreement in February 2018
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (L) and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (R) laugh after signing a cooperation agreement in February 2018, photo: picture alliance / newscom | DEBBIE HILL

Crisis shapes the future

The ammunition supplies to Israel may bring more support for India within Western capitals. However, the Arab-Israeli crisis continues to shape the future balance of power in the Middle East, mainly against the Western countries and their Gulf allies.

“The brief military confrontation between Iran and Israel has alarmed the European powers about losing their say in the region if the United States continues to disregard Palestinian demands.”

Saudi Arabia has been more cautious and sensitive to the crisis because its domestic politics is more susceptible to widespread anger and unrest if it is perceived to be supporting Israel at the cost of a Palestinian state. 

Iran, with its regional ambitions, enjoys popular support in Lebanon, Yemen, and parts of Gulf societies. Whether the Arab states accept Iran’s role in the Arab-Israeli crisis or not, it remains an influential player whose support is crucial to maintaining any peace mechanisms.

The brief military confrontation between Iran and Israel has alarmed the European powers about losing their say in the region if the United States continues to disregard Palestinian demands.

Egypt, on the other hand, is the biggest loser in the crisis despite having supported Israel for decades. Egypt is also wary of alternative routes being created by the India-Middle East Economic Corridor. The Israeli plans to carve out a new canal between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean via the occupied Gaza are not going well with Egypt. That is the reason why Egypt must protect Hamas despite its abhorrence of Hamas’ ideological patron, the Muslim Brotherhood.

India is seeking opportunities for defence exports as the Modi government focuses on developing a robust defence industry. However, selling ammunition to Israel during a war showcases arms exports as a political statement.

India’s quest for a regional strategy, however, has to be compatible with the realities of the region where India is situated. Its geopolitics will, therefore, be tested less in the Atlantic and more in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf.

Regional actors show little faith in U.S. leadership and are searching for a new security architecture, which is less dependent on the United States and Europe and willing to resolve regional crises. In the post-Gaza war period, regional powers like Egypt, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia may actively seek the participation of Russia and China in the region. India must, therefore, be ready for a broader regional engagement beyond bilateral immediacies.

Omair Anas

This text is based on a former version originally published under Creative Commons by 360info™.

Omair Anas is the Director (Research) of the Centre for Studies of Plural Societies. He was earlier associated as a Research Fellow with the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, an autonomous think-tank of India’s Ministry of External Affairs. He specializes in and teaches Non-Western International Relations, Middle East-Asia Relations, India-West Asia and India-Turkey relations.